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Introduction
Over the last few decades, a global trend of extending the reach of domestic penal power can be 
witnessed. This expansive approach to (prescriptive and adjudicative)1 jurisdiction is driven by a number 
of factors, namely the increasingly transnational nature of criminal conduct.2 The changing face of crime, 
however, can hardly be the sole explanation for the ‘movement (...) towards bases of jurisdiction other 
than territoriality’3 since the sum of territorial jurisdictions exercised by states affected by a specific 
transnational offence could, at least theoretically, provide an equally effective response – except for areas 
under no jurisdiction, such as the high seas. The increased readiness of domestic legislatures to endow 
their domestic law with a long arm in order to respond to criminal conduct beyond their borders possibly 
goes back to a different understanding of what link is necessary (if at all) for empowering a domestic 
judge with the authority to address extraterritorial conduct. One factor contributing to a broader 
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1	 In	 the	 following	 article,	 the	 term	 ‘jurisdiction’	 refers	 to	 ‘prescriptive	 jurisdiction’,	which	 is,	 however,	 quasi-identical	 to	 ‘adjudicative	
jurisdiction’	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 criminal	 law:	 jurisdiction	 to	 prescribe	 denotes	 a	 state’s	 competence	 ‘to	make	 its	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	
activities,	 relations,	 or	 status	of	 persons,	 or	 the	 interests	 of	 persons	 in	 things,	whether	 by	 legislation,	 by	 executive	 act	 or	 order,	 by	
administrative	rule	or	regulation,	or	by	determination	of	a	court’	(Restatement	of	the	Law,	Third,	1987	(Foreign	Relations	Law	of	the	
United	 States),	 §	 401(a)).	 Prescriptive	 jurisdiction	 thus	 defines	 the	 geographical	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 domestic	 law	 (C.	 Ryngaert,	
Jurisdiction in International law,	 2008,	 p.	 9).	 Adjudicative	 jurisdiction	denotes	 a	 state’s	 competence	 ‘to	 subject	 persons	 or	 thing	 to	
the	process	of	 its	 courts	or	administrative	 tribunals,	whether	 in	 civil	 or	 in	 criminal	proceedings,	whether	or	not	 the	 state	 is	 a	party	
to	 the	proceedings’	 (Foreign	Relations	 Law	of	 the	United	States,	§	401(b)).	Prescriptive	 jurisdiction	 is	 sometimes	also	 referred	 to	as	
‘legislative	competence’	and	adjudicative	jurisdiction	as	‘judicial	competence’	(see,	e.g.,	V.	Beken	&	G.	Vermeulen,	Finding the best Place 
for Prosecution: European Study on Jurisdiction Criteria,	2002,	p.	9,	Para.	9).	In	the	realm	of	criminal	law,	prescriptive	jurisdiction	generally	
coincides	with	adjudicative	jurisdiction.	In	other	words,	the	exercise	of	the	ius puniendi	by	a	specific	state	implies	the	application	of	its	
domestic	criminal	 law.	This	follows	from	the	fact	that	domestic	criminal	courts	–	notwithstanding	whether	they	adjudicate	territorial	
or	extraterritorial	conduct	–	as	a	general	rule	only	apply	their	municipal	criminal	norms	(Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	
Crime	Problems,	‘Extraterritorial	Criminal	Jurisdiction’,	1992	Criminal law Forum	3,	no.	3,	p.	458;	G.	Hallevy,	A Modern Treatise on the 
Principle of legality in Criminal law,	2010,	pp.	82-83;	 specifically	on	German	criminal	 law,	 see	K.	Ambos,	 Internationales Strafrecht: 
Strafanwendungsrecht – Völkerstrafrecht – Europäisches Strafrecht – rechtshilfe,	2011,	p.	3,	Para.	5).	Thus,	Swiss	courts	only	apply	Swiss	
criminal	law	regardless	of	whether	the	conduct	under	consideration	has	been	committed	within	or	outside	its	national	borders.	While	
the	Swiss	judge	never	applies	foreign	criminal	provisions	as	such,	we	will	see	later	that	foreign	law	is	taken	into	account	to	some	extent	
by	virtue	of	the	double	criminality	requirement	and	the	lex mitior	principle:	A.	Petrig,	‘Extraterritorial	Jurisdiction	–	The	Applicability	of	
Domestic	Criminal	Law	to	Activities	Committed	Abroad	in	Switzerland’,	in	U.	Sieber	et	al.	(eds.),	national Criminal law in a Comparative 
legal Context: General limitations on the Application of Criminal law,	2011,	pp.	319-321.
2	 International	Law	Commission,	‘Report	of	the	International	Law	Commission:	58th	Session	(1	May-9	June	and	3	July-11	August	2006)’,	
UN	Doc.	A/61/10	(2006),	Annex	E	–	Extraterritorial	Jurisdiction,	Paras.	1	and	18.
3 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic republic of Congo v belgium), Joint	Separate	Opinion	of	Judges	Higgins,	
Kooijmans	and	Buergenthal,	[2002]	ICJ	Reports,	Para.	47.
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understanding of when domestic prosecutions are warranted may be the increased significance of human 
rights law, specifically the positive obligation of states to protect persons under their jurisdiction from 
harmful conduct emanating from private persons.4 
As will be demonstrated in detail, the Swiss legislature clearly followed this expansive trend. Since 
the Swiss Criminal Code (Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch) entered into force in 1942,5 the legislature has 
continuously added new extraterritorial jurisdictional bases or extended the scope of existing bases.6 It 
has followed this expansive approach with particular resolve in the last decade.7 
The growing number of instances in which Swiss criminal law applies to extraterritorial conduct 
and which – at least for some jurisdictional bases – has effectively set the bar rather low when it comes to 
subjecting activities committed abroad to Swiss criminal jurisdiction certainly has its advantages. Most 
notably, such unilateral expansion of the geographical reach of domestic criminal law by many states 
concurrently results in a dense jurisdictional net. This net often enmeshes most components of a specific 
transnational criminal event and persons participating therein, and thus it has the beauty of (at least 
theoretically) denying ‘safe havens’8 to alleged transnational offenders and to avoid impunity. Hence, the 
supposed victim’s chances of seeing the alleged wrongdoer brought to justice are greatly enhanced. The 
reduction or even elimination of jurisdictional gaps is thus – undeniably – of utmost importance for the 
investigation and prosecution of transnational offences.9 
However, the unilateral expansion of domestic penal power does not come without its drawbacks. 
For instance, third states may perceive assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction as excessive and oppose 
them. Opposition runs the gamut from diplomatic protest to the institution of international proceedings, 
as France did in the Lotus case adjudicated by the Permanent Court of Justice in 1927.10 Furthermore, 
the uncoordinated expansion of domestic criminal jurisdiction may lead to jurisdictional overlaps and 
conflicts. Seen from the perspective of an acting individual, it may be virtually impossible to foresee and 
predict with reasonable certainty what domestic law(s) will ultimately govern his conduct of transnational 
portée. In such a situation, the individual can no longer be sure he is acting legally if aligning his conduct 
solely with the law in force at the place where he acts or omits to act.11 Rather, various domestic legal 
frameworks must potentially be observed all at once, which seems to overstretch the legal fiction that 
the acting individual should know the law. Moreover, in situations of conflicting prescripts stemming 
from different municipal laws, which are concurrently applicable, it might be impossible to entirely align 
one’s conduct.12 This has a negative impact on the principle of legality. What is more, since the acting 
individual may not be able to anticipate which domestic criminal law applies, its norms can hardly be 
said to have a deterrent effect on the individual in question. Hence, a classical goal of criminal law seems 
4	 See	Section	3.1,	infra.
5	 Swiss	Criminal	Code	of	21	December	1937,	status	of	1	October	2012	(Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937, etat le 1er octobre 2012, 
rS 311: the	abbreviation	RS	stands	for	receuil systématique du droit fédéral, where federal legal acts in force in Switzerland are collected 
in	a	systematic	order,	and	the	number	indicates	the	thematic	area	to	which	an	act	belongs)	[hereinafter,	the	‘old	Swiss	Criminal	Code’	
refers	to	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code	before	its	new	General	Part,	and	thus	‘Swiss	Criminal	Code’	refers	to	the	new	general	jurisdictional	
provisions,	which	entered	into	force	on	1	January	2007];	a	translation	of	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code	by	the	Federal	Authorities	of	the	Swiss	
Confederation	is	available	at	<www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c311_0.html>	(last	visited	25	April	2013),	since	English	is	not	an	official	language	
of	the	Swiss	Confederation,	the	translation	has	no	legal	force.
6	 The	article	at	hand	is	limited	to	provisions	providing	for	criminal	jurisdiction,	which	are	contained	in	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code	either	in	
its	‘General	Part’	(Books	1	and	3)	and	referred	to	as	general	jurisdictional	rules	or	in	its	‘Special	Part’	defining	various	offences,	some	of	
which	are	equipped	with	a	jurisdictional	rule	(Book	2).	The	article	does	not	take	into	account	jurisdictional	rules	contained	in	secondary	
criminal	law,	i.e.	federal	statutes	including,	amongst	others,	criminal	provisions.	On	the	various	locations	of	jurisdictional	rules	in	Swiss	
criminal	law,	see	Petrig,	supra	note	1,	pp.	317-318.	
7	 See	Sections	1.1-1.6,	infra.
8	 International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	p.	416,	Para.	220.
9	 United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime,	legislative Guide for the united nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and the Protocols thereto, 2004, p. 104, Para. 210.
10	 International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	Para.	28.
11	 By	making	the	application	of	extraterritorial	bases	of	 jurisdiction	dependent	on	double	criminality,	 i.e.	 that	 the	offence	 is	also	 liable	 to	
punishment	at	the	place	of	commission,	the	basic	idea	that	the	observance	of	the	law	of	the	place	of	commission	is	sufficient	can	be	re-
established:	P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	‘Vor	Art.	3’,	in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	Para.	26.	However,	
as	we	will	see	later,	double	criminality	is	not	always	required	for	triggering	the	application	of	Swiss	criminal	law	to	extraterritorial	conduct.
12	 See,	e.g.,	 International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 ‘Extraterritoriality	and	Business’,	p.	1,	<http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-
Rules/Document-centre/2006/Extraterritoriality-and-business/>	 (last	 visited	 25	April	 2013);	 the	 statement	 expresses	 the	 difficulty	 of	
foreseeing	and	aligning	conduct	because	of	jurisdictional	overlaps.
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to be compromised.13 Additionally, if it is alleged that an individual committed a transnational offence, 
there is a real risk of double prosecution and punishment if several states decide to actually exercise their 
penal power over the same person for the same conduct. 
As will be shown, the Swiss legislature is not indifferent to the problem and issues raised by its 
expansive approach to criminal jurisdiction. In order to – at least partially – accommodate concerns 
relating to the application of Swiss criminal law to extraterritorial conduct, some jurisdictional provisions 
of the Swiss Criminal Code require that foreign law be taken into account to some extent by virtue of 
the double criminality requirement and the lex mitior principle. In order to temper the negative effects 
resulting from positive jurisdictional conflicts, notably to reduce the risk of double jeopardy, Swiss judges 
are obliged to take foreign judgments into account by way of three distinct principles governing the 
situation where a foreign criminal judgment has already been issued.14
This development in Swiss law, which can be observed in other states as well, and the drawbacks it 
may bring begs the question whether such an expansive approach towards jurisdiction is permissible – 
or even encouraged or requested by international law. Against this background, this article ultimately 
explores the extent to which international law informs the reach of domestic penal power and concludes 
that international law is Janus-faced with regard to the question of the geographical scope of domestic 
criminal law. While some of its rules push for long-arm jurisdiction others put limits on the domestic 
legislature’s endeavour to expand the reach of its domestic criminal law. In light of this, the idea of 
adopting general principles on an international level to govern the definition of the scope of domestic 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction for transnational cases is tempting, albeit difficult to realize. 
1. Switzerland’s expansive approach to criminal jurisdiction 
By virtue of a constitutional amendment adopted in 1898 by the Swiss people, the Confederation – in lieu 
of the Cantons – became competent to legislate in the field of substantive criminal law.15 The unified Swiss 
Criminal Code, which was passed by Parliament in 1937,16 confirmed in a popular vote the following 
year17 and entered into force in 1942,18 originally contained four provisions defining the reach of Swiss 
penal power. According to these general jurisdictional rules, Swiss criminal law applied based on the 
principles of territoriality, active and passive personality and the protective principle.19 When viewed 
from a comparative perspective, these early jurisdictional provisions – especially the broadly construed 
territoriality principle extending to certain forms of extraterritorial conduct and the passive personality 
principle – provided Switzerland with rather far-reaching jurisdiction. 
An initial step towards extending the geographical scope of application of Swiss criminal law 
occurred when its state security provisions were revised in the early 1950s, which was deemed necessary 
in light of the post-war political order and to convert emergency legislation adopted during World War 
II into ordinary legislation.20 The catalogue of new and bolstered offences regarding protection of the 
security and independence of the Swiss Confederation were all subjected to the protective principle21 and 
it thus gained more importance. In the early 1980s, the existing jurisdictional bases – the principles of 
13	 Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	p.	93.
14 See Section 2, infra. 
15	 Dispatch	of	 the	 Federal	 Council	 to	 the	 Federal	Assembly	 in	 support	 of	 a	 proposed	 Swiss	 Penal	 Code	 (Message du Conseil fédéral à 
l’Assemblée fédérale à l’appui d’un projet de code pénal suisse (du 23 juillet 1918), FF 1918 IV 1:	the	abbreviation	FF	stands	for	Feuille 
fédéral, which contains travaux préparatoires	and	other	materials	relating	to	Swiss	legislation;	initially	cited	by	year,	volume	and	page	
number and later by year and page number only), p. 1.
16	 Order	of	Parliament	on	the	Swiss	Penal	Code	(Arrêté du Parlement concernant le Code pénal suisse (du 21 décembre 1937), FF 1937 
III 645),	pp.	625-736.
17	 Federal	Council	Decree	on	the	outcome	of	the	popular	vote	on	the	Swiss	Penal	Code	(Arrêté du Conseil fédéral concernant le résultat de 
la votation populaire du 3 juillet 1938 sur le code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937 du 5 octobre 1938, FF 1938 II 551), p. 551. 
18 Art. 401(1) old Swiss Criminal Code.
19	 Arts.	3-7	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
20	 Dispatch	of	the	Federal	Council	to	the	Federal	Assembly	in	support	of	legislation	partially	revising	the	Swiss	Penal	Code	(Message du Conseil 
fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale à l’appui d’un projet de loi révisant partiellement le code pénal suisse (du 20 juin 1949), FF 1949 I 1233), 
pp.	1249	and	1251-1258.	
21	 FF	1949	I	1233,	supra	note	20,	p.	1258;	amended	Art.	4	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code,	which	entered	into	force	on	5	January	1951	(published	in	
RO	1951	116:	the	abbreviation	RO	stands	for	receuil officiel du droit fédéral where federal legal acts are published in chronological order, 
cited by year and page number).
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territoriality, active and passive nationality and the (expanded) protective principle – were complemented 
by a further provision providing Switzerland with extraterritorial jurisdiction. This new provision 
required the application of Swiss criminal law to offences where, by virtue of an international agreement, 
Switzerland is under a duty to either extradite or prosecute the alleged offender.22 
In 2007, the completely revised General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code,23 which includes general 
jurisdictional rules,24 entered into force. Therewith, the reach of Swiss penal power expanded considerably. 
Firstly, based on the representation principle, the application of Swiss criminal law was extended to 
include situations where a request is made to extradite an alleged offender from Switzerland but refused 
for a reason unrelated to the nature of the offence.25 Secondly, two instances where Switzerland can 
exercise universal jurisdiction were added to the Swiss Criminal Code: Swiss criminal law can be applied 
to a set of offences against minors abroad26 and to extraterritorial conduct that qualifies as a ‘particularly 
serious felony that is proscribed by the international community’.27 In July 2012, a provision criminalizing 
female genital mutilation entered into force, equipped with a jurisdictional rule specifically for this crime 
and embodying an absolute and unrestricted universality principle. The expansion of Swiss criminal 
jurisdiction with the new General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code, as well as the recently introduced 
jurisdictional provision regarding the offence of female genital mutilation, gave new momentum to the 
discussion on what minimum link is necessary to justify the exercise of domestic criminal jurisdiction. 
1.1. A territoriality principle tantamount to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
Today, the territoriality principle is the primary basis for jurisdiction in criminal law matters.28 This 
also holds true for Swiss criminal law.29 However, it was only with the rise of the modern and fully 
sovereign national state in the 17th century that territorial connections began to supersede jurisdiction 
based on nationality.30 According to the territoriality principle, domestic criminal law is applicable to 
offences committed within the territory of the respective state.31 Under Swiss law, Article 3(1) of the 
Swiss Criminal Code statutorily defines this principle for felonies and misdemeanours: ‘Any person 
who commits a felony or misdemeanour in Switzerland is subject to this Code.’ This provision is also 
applicable to contraventions32 and offences defined in federal laws other than the Swiss Criminal Code, 
unless they contain deviating rules on the geographical scope of application of Swiss criminal law.33 The 
principle of territoriality is thus intrinsically linked with the notion of ‘territory’, on the one hand, and 
the concept of the ‘place of commission’, on the other.
With regard to the first element, the notion of ‘Switzerland’ in Article 3 of the Swiss Criminal 
Code refers to the territory of the Swiss State as defined by domestic and public international law.34 It 
encompasses not only the land surface within the State’s borders but also the airspace above it and the 
subsoil beneath it, such as tunnels and mines.35 Swiss criminal law also applies ratione loci to foreign 
diplomatic missions and international organizations physically present in Switzerland. The theory that 
22	 Dispatch	on	the	European	Convention	on	the	Suppression	of	Terrorism	and	the	modification	of	the	Swiss	Penal	Code	(Message concernant 
la Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme et la modification du code pénal suisse du 24 mars 1982, FF 1982 II 1), 
pp.	11-12.
23	 Adopted	by	the	Swiss	Parliament	on	13	December	2002	and	published	in	RO	2006	3459.
24	 Arts.	3-	8	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
25	 Art.	7(2)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
26 Art. 5 Swiss Criminal Code.
27	 Art.	 7(2)(b)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code;	 wording	 of	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 by	 the	 Federal	 Authorities	 of	 the	 Swiss	
Confederation,	see	note	5,	supra.
28	 Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	p.	446;	Beken	&	Vermeulen,	supra	note	1,	p.	11.
29	 This	follows,	inter	alia,	from	a	systematic	reading	of	the	jurisdictional	rules	laid	down	in	Arts.	3-8	Swiss	Criminal	Code,	where	the	provision	
defining	the	territoriality	principle	precedes	all	other	jurisdictional	rules.
30	 Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	pp.	42	and	47-54.
31	 Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	p.	446.
32	 Art.	104	Swiss	Criminal	Code	stipulates	that,	subject	to	the	changes	set	forth	in	Arts.	105-109	Swiss	Criminal	Code,	the	provisions	of	the	
First	Part	of	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code	pertaining	to	felonies	and	misdemeanours	(and	thus	the	territoriality	principle	defined	in	Art.	3	Swiss	
Criminal	Code)	also	apply	to	contraventions.
33 Art. 333(1) Swiss Criminal Code.
34	 M.	Shaw,	‘Territory	in	International	Law’,	1982	netherlands Yearbook of International law	13,	Sections	2	and	6	(definition	of	territory	
under	public	international	law)	and	J.	Hurtado	Pozo,	Droit pénal: Partie générale,	2008,	pp.	67-68,	Paras.	194-196	(definition	of	Swiss	
territory).
35	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	67,	Para.	194.
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the land parcels on which they are located do not belong to the host state’s territory is outdated. Therefore, 
conduct taking place in these premises falls within the geographical scope of application of Swiss law. Yet, 
the application of Swiss criminal law in these situations may be hindered by diplomatic immunities and, 
hence, due to ratione personae considerations.36 
Finally, in line with public international law,37 ships and aircraft flying the Swiss flag are not considered 
to be floating or flying parts of Swiss territory.38 Rather, offences committed on board such vessels are 
subject to Swiss criminal law based on the flag state principle.39
Rather than through an expanded definition of ‘territory’ – where public international law does 
not provide states with a wide margin of interpretation40 – it is by broadly defining the concept of 
the ‘place of commission’ that states can extend the reach of the territoriality principle so that it also 
includes extraterritorial conduct. However, there is little agreement among states on ‘how little of the 
offence need take place or have effect in the State before it can claim territorial jurisdiction’.41 Various 
tests have been developed to determine the minimum territorial link necessary to give rise to a place of 
commission in the respective state. The Swiss legislature has opted for a very broad test along the lines of 
the ubiquity theory: an offence is considered to have been committed in Switzerland if either the place 
where the criminal conduct was carried out or the place where the criminal result occurred is located 
in Switzerland.42 The ubiquity theory as defined by the Swiss legislature43 thus combines the theory of 
acting (also known as the objective territoriality principle44) and the theory of result (sometimes referred 
to as the effects doctrine45). According to the theory of acting, only the place of conduct is deemed to be 
a place of commission; meanwhile, under the theory of result, only the place where the criminal result 
occurs, i.e. where the conduct committed abroad displays its effects, qualifies as a place of commission.46 
According to the ubiquity theory expressed in Article 8(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, an offence 
is considered to have been committed in Switzerland if either the place where the offender acted (crime 
of commission) or where he failed to act contrary to a duty (crime of omission) is located within Swiss 
territory. Thereby, it is sufficient that only one of the objective definitional elements of the offence47 was 
36	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	68,	Para.	195,	citing	BGE	109	IV	156,	where	the	Swiss	Federal	Supreme	Court	decided	that	Swiss	criminal	
courts	 are	 competent	 to	 prosecute	 criminal	 acts	 allegedly	 committed	 by	 persons	 occupying	 the	 Polish	 embassy	 in	 Switzerland	 (the	
abbreviation	BGE	refers	to	judgments	by	the	Swiss	Federal	Supreme	Court).
37	 For	a	long	time	the	jurisdiction	of	the	flag	state	over	its	ships	has	been	based	on	the	fiction	of	the	territoriality	or	quasi-territoriality	of	
ships (see, e.g., The Case of the S.S. “lotus” (France v Turkey), Judgment	[1927]	PICJ,	Series	A,	no.	10P,	p.	25;	uS v Flores,	289	US	137	
(1933),	p.	585).	Today,	the	floating	territories	doctrine	has	been	abandoned	(R.J.	Dupuy	&	D.	Vignes,	A Handbook on the new law of the 
Sea,	1991,	p.	407)	and	is	considered	to	be	superfluous	(I.	Brownlie,	Principles of Public International law,	2008,	p.	113).
38	 On	abandoning	the	floating	territories	doctrine	in	relation	to	aircraft	and	ships	under	Swiss	law,	see,	e.g.,	Dispatch	of	the	Federal	Council	
to	the	Federal	Assembly	on	amendment	of	the	aviation	law	(Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant la modification 
de la loi sur la navigation aérienne (du 28 septembre 1962), FF 1962 713),	p.	728:	‘On évite ainsi volontairement de faire de l’aéronef, 
même par une fiction, une «partie volante du territoire national». le droit de légiférer et d’appliquer des règles de droit n‘est pas considéré 
comme découlant de la souveraineté territoriale de l’Etat d’immatriculation; il s‘agit au contraire d‘une juridiction sur les personnes et 
sur les biens, d‘un for constitué par la communauté organisée à bord sous l‘autorité du commandant. Ce sont en principe les mêmes 
considérations que nous vous avons soumises dans notre message du 22 février 1952, concernant le projet de la loi sur la navigation 
maritime sous pavillon suisse.’
39	 With	regard	to	ships,	the	flag	state	principle	is	laid	down	in	Art.	4	Swiss	Federal	Law	of	23	September	1953	on	Navigation	under	the	Swiss	
Flag	(loi fédérale sur la navigation maritime sous pavillon suisse du 23 septembre 1953, rS 747.30).	Regarding	aircraft,	the	flag	state	
principle	is	provided	for	in	the	Air	Navigation	Law,	namely	Arts.	11	and	97	(loi fédérale sur l’aviation du 21 décembre 1948, rS 748.0).
40	 On	the	notion	of	‘territory’	under	international	law,	see	Shaw,	supra	note	34,	Sections	2	and	6.
41	 G.	Gilbert,	responding to International Crime,	2006,	p.	76.
42	 Art.	8	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	M.	Harari	&	M.	Liniger	Gros,	‘Art.	8’,	in	R.	Roth	&	L.	Moreillon	(eds.),	Commentaire romand: Code pénal I,	2009,	
p.	90,	Para.	10.
43	 There	 is	no	unified	and	unequivocal	definition	of	the	ubiquity	doctrine	and	states	give	different	meanings	to	the	concept:	Council	of	
Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	pp.	446-447.
44	 See,	e.g.,	International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	Para.	11:	‘The	objective	territoriality	principle	may	be	understood	as	referring	to	
the	jurisdiction	that	a	State	may	exercise	with	respect	to	persons,	property	or	acts	outside	its	territory	when	a	constitutive	element	of	the	
conduct	sought	to	be	regulated	occurred	in	the	territory	of	the	State.’
45	 See,	e.g.,	 International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	Para.	12:	 ‘The	effects	doctrine	may	be	understood	as	referring	to	 jurisdiction	
asserted	with	regard	to	the	conduct	of	a	foreign	national	occurring	outside	the	territory	a	State	which	has	a	substantial	effect	within	that	
territory.	This	basis,	while	closely	related	to	the	objective	territoriality	principle,	does	not	require	that	an	element	of	the	conduct	take	
place	in	the	territory	of	the	regulating	State.’
46	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	69,	Para.	199	and	p.	70,	Para.	201.
47	 Under	Swiss	criminal	law,	every	offence	is	composed	of	objective	and	subjective	definitional	elements.	While	the	subjective	elements	
relate	to	the	offender’s	inner	world	(see	note	76,	infra),	the	objective	elements	are	those	aspects	of	an	offence	that	display	or	manifest	
themselves	 externally,	 that	 is,	 discernible	 conditions,	 factors	 and	 changes	 in	 the	outside	world,	 such	 as	 the	description	of	who	 can	
commit	the	offence,	the	incriminated	conduct,	the	object	on	which	the	criminal	act	or	omission	is	performed,	the	result	of	the	criminal	
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(partially) fulfilled in Switzerland.48 Further, the provision stipulates that the place where the offence 
displays its effect, i.e. where the result of the allegedly criminal conduct occurs, gives rise to a place of 
commission in Switzerland. The newer case law of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court interprets the notion 
of ‘result’ as synonymous with its definition in the context of result offences. Hence, only those changes in 
the outside world that correspond to an objective definitional element of the offence qualify as a result in 
the sense of Article 8 of the Swiss Criminal Code.49 If, from the offender’s perspective, the result occurs 
at a random place, it should not give rise to a place of commission; rather, only the place where the result 
was intended to occur according to the offender’s intention should qualify as such.50
Article 8(2) of the Swiss Criminal Code defines the place of commission with regard to attempted 
offences. An attempt gives rise to a place of commission in Switzerland if it was committed on Swiss 
territory or if the result should have occurred there according to the offender’s intention. Thus, due to the 
nature of attempts, the place where the criminal result occurs is actually substituted by the place where 
the result should have occurred according to the author’s intention.51 Mere preparatory acts generally 
do not give rise to a place of commission in Switzerland. Rather, the threshold of an attempt must be 
reached. An exception constitutes punishable preparatory acts pertaining to specific crimes exhaustively 
listed in Article 260bis(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code.52 
It is also by participating in an offence that a person can become caught in the jurisdictional 
maelstrom of Switzerland. A black-letter legal norm on participation and the determination of the place 
of commission is missing from Swiss criminal law. According to case law, the criminal conduct of one 
co-perpetrator in Switzerland gives rise to a place of commission in Switzerland for all co-perpetrators. 
Likewise, and in line with the relative ubiquity theory, the criminal result obtained on Swiss territory 
by one co-perpetrator establishes a place of commission in Switzerland for every co-perpetrator.53 An 
instigator acting abroad has committed an offence in Switzerland if the result of the instigation occurred 
in Switzerland or, in the case of an attempt, the result should have occurred in Switzerland. The concept 
is the same for persons who aid and abet an offence from abroad and the result occurs in Switzerland. 
However, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has put a limit on the reach of Swiss criminal law with regard 
to persons instigating or aiding and abetting in Switzerland an offence committed abroad: they are not 
subject to Swiss criminal law based on the territoriality principle (which does not exclude the application 
of Swiss criminal law to such persons based on so-called extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction).54 Some 
scholars criticize this view and argue in favour of expanding the reach of Swiss criminal law so as to at 
least cover those cases where the principal offence is punishable in the state where it was committed.55
Despite this limitation, it can be concluded that the Swiss legislature and courts shaped the 
territoriality principle in a way that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct in 
a rather complete and comprehensive fashion. The legislature did so by opting for a broad localization 
theory when drafting the jurisdictional rules of the unified Swiss Criminal Code in the late 1930s. When 
revising the General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code at the turn of the millennium, it did not question 
the idea of a territoriality principle with extraterritorial reach.56 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has 
also contributed to a broad territoriality principle. Where the provisions defining the territoriality 
conduct	and	the	causality	between	conduct	and	result:	A.	Petrig,	‘Objective	Aspects	of	the	Offense	in	Switzerland’,	 in	U.	Sieber	et	al.	
(eds.), national Criminal law in a Comparative legal Context: Defining Criminal Conduct, 2011, p. 255.
48	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	70,	Paras.	201-202.	
49	 P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	‘Art.	8’,	in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	p.	231,	Para.	7;	BGE	105	IV	326,	
330 E. 3.g.
50	 Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	49,	p.	232,	Para.	8.	This	limitation	is	deduced	from	Art.	8(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	pertaining	to	attempted	
crimes, which should a fortiori	apply	to	completed	offences.
51	 Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	42,	p.	99,	Paras.	55–58;	S.	Trechsel	&	H.	Vest,	‘Artikel	8	StGB’,	in	S.	Trechsel	&	M.	Pieth	(eds.),	Schweizerisches 
Strafgesetzbuch: Praxiskommentar, 2013, p. 34, Para. 5.
52	 Trechsel	&	Vest,	supra	note	51,	pp.	33-34,	Para.	2.
53	 Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	49,	p.	234,	Para.	13;	Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	42,	p.	98,	Paras.	48–49.
54	 A.	Donatsch	&	B.	Tag,	Strafrecht I: Verbrechenslehre,	2006,	p.	51;	Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	42,	pp.	98-99,	Para.	54;	both	citing	
BGE	104	IV	77,	86–87	E.	7b.
55	 Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	42,	pp.	98–99,	Para.	54,	with	references	to	scholars	maintaining	this	view.
56	 However,	the	Swiss	legislature	slightly	changed	the	wording	of	the	respective	provisions	in	order	to	enhance	their	precision:	A.	Eicker,	
‘Das	Schweizerische	Internationale	Strafrecht	vor	und	nach	der	Revision	des	Allgemeinen	Teils	des	Strafgesetzbuches:	Zur	Interpretation	
des	“engen	Bezug”	als	verstecktes	Opportunitätsprinzip’,	2006	Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht	124,	pp.	295–320,	pp.	303-304.
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principle and the place of commission are scant and fragmentary, for instance regarding the question 
of when participation in an offence gives rise to a place of commission in Switzerland, it has generally 
interpreted them in such a way as to provide the territoriality principle with extraterritorial reach.57 It has 
thus equipped the territoriality principle with a long arm where black-letter law did not do so explicitly.
Due to the broad localization theory contemplated in Article 8 of the Swiss Criminal Code, by 
which conduct physically taking place abroad is constructively brought within Swiss territory, the usual 
division between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction is, in many instances, without any substance. 
In such cases, the line between the two concepts blurs and the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is 
tantamount to what is commonly referred to as ‘exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction’.58 When applying 
Swiss criminal law based on so-called extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction, foreign law, i.e. the law of the 
place of commission, is taken into account through either the double criminality requirement or the 
lex mitior principle.59 However, if Swiss penal power is exercised over conduct committed abroad based 
on the (broadly construed) territoriality principle, there is no room to take foreign law into account. 
This seems coherent and logical when considering the territoriality principle as an isolated concept: 
the logic is that Swiss law applies to conduct taking place in Switzerland. However, when looking at the 
territoriality principle in combination with the broad localization theory under Swiss criminal law, the 
place of commission in Switzerland is not a natural but a constructed one. The rationale of applying 
domestic law (and not taking foreign law into account) to conduct taking place domestically may be 
questioned when the place of commission is in the prosecuting state merely by virtue of a legal fiction. 
Arguably, the safeguard of considering the law of the real and physical place of commission by means of 
a double criminality requirement or the lex mitior principle should apply in such a case – as it generally 
does when exercising ‘true’ extraterritorial jurisdiction.
1.2. Far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction based on nationality since the 1940s
States, especially those following the continental legal tradition, generally provide for extensive criminal 
jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender.60 That a state can apply its criminal law to its nationals 
and prosecute them in domestic courts is hardly contested.61 From a public international law perspective, 
the justification is found in the principle of nationality, i.e. the state’s power over its nationals. From a 
national perspective, it may allow for the prosecution of an alleged offender (and thus avoid potential 
impunity) while respecting the prohibition on extraditing its own nationals.62
Various states, especially those with legal systems rooted in civil law, also provide domestic criminal 
jurisdiction over offences allegedly committed against its nationals. Whether the nationality of the victim 
is a sufficient jurisdictional link under international law is a controversial topic of discussion.63 The passive 
personality principle is, inter alia, criticized since for the alleged perpetrator, who generally does not 
know the nationality of the victim, the law by which his conduct will be governed is hardly foreseeable.64 
Yet, the view that the principle is controversial is not universally shared and the principle has gained 
acceptance over the last few years (at least for particular offences), as evidenced by, inter alia, its adoption 
by an increasing number of states.65 It should be noted that a series of international conventions, for 
57	 Not	only	was	the	provision	of	the	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code	on	the	place	of	commission	silent	in	this	respect,	but	the	current	Art.	8	Swiss	
Criminal	Code	does	not	explicitly	 govern	 the	 issue	either.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 future,	 courts	will	 continue	 to	play	an	 important	 role	 in	
defining	the	extraterritorial	reach	of	the	territoriality	principle	under	Swiss	Criminal	Law:	Eicker,	supra	note	56,	p.	303.
58	 Gilbert,	supra	note	41,	p.	76.
59	 On	these	two	principles,	see	Petrig,	supra	note	1,	pp.	319-321.
60	 Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	p.	448.
61	 Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	p.	89.
62	 Ambos,	supra	note	1,	p.	41,	Para.	39.	Under	Swiss	law,	for	example,	a	Swiss	national	may	not	be	extradited	or	surrendered	to	a	foreign	
state	without	his	consent:	see,	e.g.,	Art.	25(1)	Swiss	Federal	Constitution	(Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 
1999, rS 101),	and	Art.	7	Federal	Act	on	International	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters	(loi fédérale du 20 mars 1981 sur l’entraide 
internationale en matière pénale, rS 351.1;	a	translation	of	this	legal	act	by	the	Federal	Authorities	of	the	Swiss	Confederation	is	available	
at	<www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c351_1.html> (last visited 25 April 2013)).
63	 Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	p.	92;	Ambos,	supra	note	1,	p.	53.
64	 Ambos,	supra	note	1,	p.	53,	Para.	71,	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	p.	93.
65	 International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	Para.	15;	Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic republic of 
Congo v belgium), Joint	Separate	Opinion	of	Judges	Higgins,	Kooijmans	and	Buergenthal,	[2002]	ICJ	Reports,	Para.	47;	Council	of	Europe	
–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	p.	450.
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example in the field of counter-terrorism, even encourage states to establish the passive personality 
principle for the offences covered by the respective treaty.66
Despite the controversy surrounding the passive personality principle, the Swiss legislature included 
it in the original Swiss Criminal Code of 1937 alongside the active personality principle.67 The provisions 
on the active and passive personality principles considerably broadened the geographical scope of 
application of Swiss criminal law. With the revision of the General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code, which 
entered into force in 2007, the gist of the active and passive personality principles remained untouched.68 
However, under current law, the two principles are less prominently featured and are both contained 
in Article 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code – a subsidiary provision going beyond these two principles 
entitled ‘Other offences committed abroad’.69 The requirements for Swiss criminal law to apply based on 
the Swiss nationality of the alleged offender (the active personality principle) or supposed victim (the 
passive personality principle) have been unified with this new jurisdictional provision and are found in 
Article 7(1)(a) to (c) of the Swiss Criminal Code.
Article 7(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code stipulating the conditions for triggering the active and 
passive personality principles does not explicitly state that the alleged offender or supposed victim 
has to possess Swiss nationality. However, this requirement follows e contrario from the introductory 
sentence of Article 7(2) of the Swiss Criminal Code.70 It suffices that the alleged offender acquired Swiss 
nationality after the commission of the offence as long as he is Swiss at the time of the judgment. Whether 
he possesses other nationalities in addition to Swiss nationality is immaterial.71 The latter also holds true 
for the supposed victim,72 who has to be a Swiss national at the time the offence was committed or the 
result obtained.73
In addition to the nationality requirement, the three conditions set forth in Article 7(1) of the Swiss 
Criminal Code must all be met in order to apply Swiss criminal law based on the active or passive 
nationality principle. Firstly, double criminality is required, i.e. the offence must also be punishable in 
the state where the offence was committed. Thereby, the Swiss judge takes foreign law into account ex 
officio and the suspect does not bear any burden of proof.74 According to the case law of the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court, double criminality does not necessarily require that the foreign and domestic criminal 
laws be identical. Rather, it suffices that the conduct in question matches the objective75 and subjective 
definitional elements of an offence76 under both laws. Further requirements of criminal liability, for 
example relating to unlawfulness and culpability or additional prerequisites of criminal liability,77 need 
not be taken into account. Also, the consequences of the criminal offence do not have to be the same 
under both laws – that is, the type of sanction can differ. However, the subject of the sanction has to be 
66	 Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	p.	450.
67	 See	Art.	5	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code	stipulating	the	passive	personality	principle	and	Art.	6	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code	regarding	the	active	
personality principle.
68	 The	requirements	under	which	the	active	and	the	passive	personality	principles	apply	have	been	slightly	changed.	Thus,	for	instance,	
under	the	new	jurisdictional	provision,	the	passive	personality	principle	no	longer	applies	to	minor	offences:	P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	‘Art.	7’,	
in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	p.	223.
69	 The	 subsidiary	nature	of	 the	provision	 follows	 from	 its	 introductory	 sentence:	 ‘Any	person	who	commits	a	 felony	or	misdemeanour	
abroad	where	the	requirements	of	Articles	4,	5	or	6	are	not	fulfilled	is	subject	to	this	Code	if	(...)’:	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	222,	
Para. 1.
70	 The	 introductory	sentence	of	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	stipulates	the	principle	of	 representation	 in	cases	where	Switzerland	has	
refused	extradition	for	a	reason	unrelated	to	the	nature	of	the	offence	and	the	universality	principle	for	particularly	serious	offences	
reads:	‘If	the	person	concerned	is	not	Swiss	and	if	the	felony	or	misdemeanour	was	not	committed	against	a	Swiss	person	(...)’.
71	 S.	Trechsel	&	H.	Vest,	‘Artikel	7	StGB’,	in	S.	Trechsel	&	M.	Pieth	(eds.),	Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch: Praxiskommentar, 2013, p. 31, 
Para.	9,	citing	BGE	117	IV	369,	372,	E.	3-7.
72	 Trechsel	&	Vest,	supra	note	71,	p.	29,	Para.	3.
73	 Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	225.
74	 Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	p.	190,	Paras.	26	and	29.
75	 On	the	notion	of	‘objective	definitional	elements	of	an	offence’	under	Swiss	law,	see	note	47,	supra.
76	 The	subjective	definitional	elements	of	an	offence	describe	the	acting	person’s	inner	attitude	towards	his	conduct	and	thus	relates	to	the	
offender’s	inner	world.	Swiss	criminal	law	requires	that	the	alleged	offender	acts	either	with	intent	or	negligence:	A.	Petrig,	‘Subjective	
Aspects	of	the	Offense	in	Switzerland’,	in	U.	Sieber	et	al.	(eds.),	national Criminal law in a Comparative legal Context: Defining Criminal 
Conduct, 2011, p. 453.
77	 Under	Swiss	criminal	law,	the	general	requirements	of	criminal	liability	are,	in	a	nutshell,	the	following:	human	conduct,	fulfilment	of	
the	objective	and	subjective	definitional	elements	of	the	offence,	unlawfulness,	culpability	and	(exceptionally)	additional	prerequisites	
of	 criminal	 liability;	 see	 A.	 Petrig,	 ‘Concept	 and	 Systematization	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Offense	 in	 Switzerland’,	 in	 U.	 Sieber	 et	 al.	 (eds.),	
national Criminal law in a Comparative legal Context: Defining Criminal Conduct,	2011,	pp.	105-111.
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the same under Swiss and foreign law. When deciding on double criminality, it is relevant whether, at the 
time of the commission of the offence (rather than at the time of the judgment), the conduct was liable to 
prosecution at the place of commission.78 Alternatively, Article 7(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code provides 
that the active or passive personality principle can be applied to an offence that was committed in a 
place not subject to criminal jurisdiction, such as the high seas.79 The second criterion to be fulfilled in 
order to apply Swiss law based on the principle of active or passive nationality is that the alleged offender 
is voluntarily present in Switzerland; according to some authors, even involuntary presence suffices.80 
Alternatively, the presence of the offender can be obtained through lawful extradition proceedings. 
However, presence achieved by way of abduction, deception or circumvention of extradition proceedings 
does not fulfil the presence requirement.81 Lastly, the crime in question must be an extraditable offence 
under Swiss law,82 yet the alleged offender has not been extradited. The reason for non-extradition, such 
as the absence of an extradition request or because such a request has been rejected – is irrelevant.83 
This third requirement is intended to prevent offenders who commit minor offences abroad from being 
subjected to Swiss criminal law, i.e. that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not extend to petty crimes.84
In sum, the principles of active and passive personality already available under the old Swiss Criminal 
Code, which entered into force in 1942, have been maintained under the new General Part in force since 
2007. However, instead of two separate provisions, the principles are somewhat hidden in a more general 
provision on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Yet, the requirements which are necessary for Swiss criminal 
law to apply based on the nationality of the alleged offender or supposed victim remain the same under 
the new jurisdictional provision. Thus, the broad approach to criminal jurisdiction based on nationality 
has been recently confirmed.
1.3. A first expansive step in the 1950s: a bolstered protective principle
In addition to a territoriality principle embracing extraterritorial criminal conduct and the active and 
passive personality principles, the Swiss Criminal Code of 1937 stipulated the application of Swiss 
criminal law based on the protective principle. The protective principle allows for the application of 
municipal criminal law to a set of offences that violate the interests of the respective state. Applying 
domestic law based on the protective principle is generally justified by every state’s right to self-defence.85 
Since offences that violate fundamental state interests are likely to emanate from abroad, taken in 
conjunction with the presumption that a third state may not have (sufficiently severe) laws in place to 
prosecute such offences or lack an interest in prosecuting alleged offenders, it is deemed important that 
the victim state can apply its own criminal law in such instances.86
Under public international law, the protective principle as such is a recognized basis for applying 
domestic criminal law to conduct committed abroad, yet its reach is contested. While doctrine and 
case law hold that the principle serves to protect ‘essential interests of the State’, opinions on what they 
concretely encompass differ and a tendency to stretch the concept can be observed. Thus, some states 
not only define the protection of national security, the public purse, the security of public services, 
and diplomatic and consular missions as essential state interests, but interpret the notion broadly so as 
78	 Popp	&	Levante,	 supra	note	11,	pp.	190-191,	Paras.	27-28;	P.	Popp,	Grundzüge der internationalen rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 2001, 
pp.	142-143,	Paras.	211-212	and	pp.	148-153,	Paras.	220-228;	M.	Henzelin,	‘Art.	6’,	in	R.	Roth	&	L.	Moreillon	(eds.),	Commentaire romand: 
Code pénal I,	2009,	p.	71,	Para.	21.
79	 Art.	7(1)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
80	 Henzelin,	supra	note	78,	p.	72,	Para.	24.
81	 Art.	7(1)(b)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
82	 The	notion	of	‘extraditable	offences’	is	defined	in	Art.	35	Federal	Act	on	International	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters.
83	 Art.	7(1)(c)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	Dispatch	on	amending	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(general	provisions,	entry	into	force	and	implementation)	
and the Military Criminal Code and a federal law governing the criminal status of minors (Message concernant la modification du code 
pénal suisse (dispositions générales, entrée en vigueur et application du code pénal) et du code pénal militaire ainsi qu’une loi fédérale 
régissant la condition pénale des mineurs du 21 septembre 1998, FF 1998 1787),	 pp.	 1804-1805;	M.	Henzelin,	 ‘Art.	 7’,	 in	R.	Roth	&	
L. Moreillon (eds.), Commentaire romand: Code pénal I,	2009,	p.	81,	Para.	11.
84	 FF	1998	1787,	supra	note	83,	p.	1804.
85	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	pp.	76-77,	Para.	220.
86	 M.	Harari	&	M.	Liniger	Gros,	‘Art.	4’,	in	R.	Roth	&	L.	Moreillon	(eds.),	Commentaire romand: Code pénal I,	2009,	p.	49,	Para.	8.
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to include environmental and industrial interests, the protection of their capital markets, or national 
aviation or shipping.87 
The definition of which state interests qualify as ‘essential’ is not only relative but bears the impression 
of the respective Zeitgeist. The Swiss legislature first defined these interests when adopting the state 
security provisions of the Swiss Criminal Code of 1937, which are amenable to the protective principle. 
Some years later, these state security provisions were deemed insufficient in light of growing right and 
left-wing extremism in a Europe that was standing on the doorstep of war and were therefore bolstered 
by way of emergency legislation.88 Following World War II, the Swiss Criminal Code’s provisions on 
state security were revised. This was considered necessary in order to recast the emergency legislation as 
ordinary and democratically legitimized criminal provisions and to adapt them to the transformed risk 
matrix of the new political order,89 most notably to be prepared for risks emanating from communist 
movements and states.90 These new or bolstered state security provisions of the Swiss Criminal Code 
were all subjected to the protective principle, which thereby gained importance.91 
The current wording of the provision establishing the protective principle stipulates that persons who 
commit an offence listed in Title 13 of the Swiss Criminal Code92 – entitled ‘Felonies and Misdemeanours 
against the State and National Security’ – are subject to the Swiss Criminal Code. Swiss criminal law 
thus applies to a limited number of extraterritorially committed offences which potentially endanger the 
state’s existence, national security or other vital state interests.93 The offences triggering the protective 
principle include high treason,94 attacks on the independence of the Confederation,95 diplomatic 
treason,96 the moving of national boundary markers,97 political and military espionage,98 attacks on the 
constitutional order99 or unlawful association.100 The catalogue of offences mentioned in the provision is 
exhaustive. Thus, the protective principle set forth in Article 4(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code cannot be 
applied to any other criminal conduct. However, various provisions of secondary Swiss criminal law101 
also foresee the protective principle.102 Despite the expansion of the protective principle in the 1950s by 
subjecting new and bolstered state security provisions to it, Switzerland still pursues a rather narrow and 
conservative approach to ‘essential State interests’. An exception may be observed in the provision on 
industrial espionage, which is amenable to the protective principle,103 where it is questionable whether 
such conduct endangers Switzerland’s independence or national security. 
1.4. Extension of domestic jurisdiction driven by international law in the 1980s
In the 1980s, the legislature added a provision to the Swiss Criminal Code allowing for its application 
to offences that Switzerland is, by virtue of an international agreement, obliged to prosecute if it does 
not extradite the alleged offender.104 Thereby, Switzerland exercises jurisdiction in representation, i.e. 
it prosecutes offences committed abroad under Swiss criminal law instead or on behalf of third states 
having a closer link to the offence.105 
87	 Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	pp.	451-452.
88	 FF	1949	I	1233,	supra	note	20,	p.	1238.
89	 FF	1949	I	1233,	supra	note	20,	p.	1233.
90	 FF	1949	I	1233,	supra	note	20,	pp.	1238-1239.
91	 FF	1949	I	1233,	supra	note	20,	p.	1242.
92	 Arts.	265-278	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
93	 Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	76,	Para.	219	and	p.	77,	Para.	221.
94	 Art.	265	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
95	 Art.	266	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
96	 Art.	267	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
97	 Art.	268	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
98	 Arts.	272-274	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
99	 Art.	275	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
100	Art.	275ter Swiss Criminal Code.
101	See,	e.g.,	Art.	33(4)	Federal	Law	on	War	Material	(loi fédérale du 13 décembre 1996 sur le matériel de guerre, rS 514.51).
102	P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	‘Art.	4’,	in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	p.	207,	Para.	1.
103	Art.	273	Swiss	Criminal	Code	read	together	with	Art.	4	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
104	Art.	6bis old Swiss Criminal Code.
105	P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	 ‘Art.	6’,	 in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	pp.	215-216,	Para.	1;	some	
authors	consider	the	application	of	Swiss	criminal	law	based	on	this	provision	to	constitute	an	exercise	of	universal	jurisdiction:	see,	e.g.,	
Eicker,	supra	note	56,	pp.	301-302	(regarding	Art.	6bis	old	Swiss	Criminal	Code)	and	pp.	310-311	(regarding	Art.	6	Swiss	Criminal	Code).	
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Public international law undeniably has the function of limiting the jurisdiction of states.106 However, 
it can also be the driving force behind an expansion of domestic criminal jurisdiction, as is the case here.107 
Concretely, it was Switzerland’s ratification of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
of 1977108 that resulted in a general jurisdictional provision stipulating the principle of representation for 
offences where Switzerland is obliged under an international agreement to either prosecute or extradite 
the alleged offender. The four jurisdictional bases contained in the Swiss Criminal Code at that time 
– the principles of territoriality, active and passive nationality and the protective principle  – would 
not have always provided Switzerland with jurisdiction over persons suspected of having engaged in 
conduct qualifying as an offence for which international law stipulates a duty to extradite or prosecute.109 
Therefore, in order to be able to ratify this and other conventions on transnational criminal law containing 
an aut  dedere aut iudicare clause and to live up to the obligation to prosecute an alleged offender if 
Switzerland decides not to extradite him or her, this new general jurisdictional provision was included 
in the Swiss Criminal Code in the early 1980s.110 The provision, with some minor modifications to its 
wording,111 was carried over to the new General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code.112
According to Article 6 of the Swiss Criminal Code, four criteria must be met in order to apply 
Swiss criminal law to offences for which a duty to extradite or prosecute exists. Firstly, the offence must 
have been committed abroad. Secondly, Switzerland has an obligation under an international agreement 
to prosecute this type of offence. Various international treaties, namely in the field of human rights,113 
health,114 transportation115 and terrorism,116 contain such an obligation. Thirdly, since Switzerland is 
acting on behalf of a third state having a closer link to the offence, the provision requires that the offence 
is also punishable at the place of commission (double criminality)117 or, alternatively, that the place of 
commission is not subject to any penal power, such as the high seas.118 Lastly, the offender has to be 
(voluntarily)119 present in Switzerland and has not been extradited. Whether extradition has priority over 
prosecution or vice versa, or whether Switzerland can only prosecute after an extradition request from 
the competent third state has been filed and rejected, can only be answered by considering a specific 
international agreement.120
106	International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2;	see	also,	e.g.,	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	Chapter	2	on	‘Public	International	Law	Approaches	
to	Jurisdiction’,	and	M.	Stigall,	 ‘International	Law	and	Limitations	on	the	Exercise	of	Extraterritorial	Jurisdiction	in	U.S.	Domestic	Law’,	
2012 Hastings International and Comparative law review	 35,	no.	2,	 Section	V	entitled	 ‘Limitations	on	Extraterritorial	 Jurisdiction	 in	
International	Law’.	
107	See	also	Section	3.1,	infra,	on	international	law	pushing	for	long-arm	jurisdiction.
108	1977	European	Convention	on	the	Suppression	of	Terrorism,	European Treaty Series	No.	090	(Convention européenne du 27 janvier 1977 
pour la répression du terrorisme, rS 0.353.3).
109	Switzerland	had	ratified	other	international	agreements	containing	an	aut dedere aut iudicare clause before it became a party to the 
European	Convention	on	the	Suppression	of	Terrorism	of	1977.	However,	unlike	the	European	Convention	on	the	Suppression	of	Terrorism	
of	1977,	which	merely	obliges	State	Parties	to	extradite	alleged	terrorists	or	to	establish	 jurisdiction	over	so-called	terrorist	offences	
(Art.	6),	these	other	agreements	require	State	Parties	to	criminalize	specific	conduct	under	domestic	law.	For	each	offence	adopted	under	
Swiss	criminal	law	in	implementation	of	such	an	international	agreement,	the	Swiss	legislature	defined	its	extraterritorial	reach	in	the	
respective	offence	description,	i.e.	the	scope	of	criminal	jurisdiction	was	defined	with	respect	to	the	specific	offence	of	terrorism	only	and	
not	by	means	of	a	general	jurisdictional	rule:	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	105,	p.	216.
110	FF	1982	II	1,	supra	note	22,	p.	6.
111	For	an	overview	of	the	changes,	see	Eicker,	supra	note	56,	pp.	310-311.	Thus,	for	instance,	the	requirement	that	‘the	act	is	also	liable	to	
prosecution	at	the	place	of	commission’	(double	criminality)	has	been	complemented	by	the	alterative	that	‘no	criminal	law	jurisdiction	
applies	at	the	place	of	commission’,	such	as	on	the	high	seas.	
112	Art.	6	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
113	E.g.	1984	Convention	Against	Torture	and	Other	Cruel,	Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment,	1465	united nations Treaty Series 
p.	85	(Convention du 10 décembre 1984 contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, rS 0.105).
114	E.g.	 1971	 Convention	on	 Psychotropic	 Substances,	 1019	united nations Treaty Series p.	 175	 (Convention du 21 février 1971 sur les 
substances psychotropes, rS 0.812.121.02).
115	E.g.	1971	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	Unlawful	Acts	against	the	Safety	of	Civil	Aviation,	974	united nations Treaty Series	p.	177	
(Convention du 23 septembre 1971 pour la répression d’actes illicites dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile, rS 0.748.710.3).
116	E.g.	1999	International	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	the	Financing	of	Terrorism,	2178	united nations Treaty Series	p.	197	(Convention 
internationale du 9 décembre 1999 pour la répression du financement du terrorisme, rS 0.353.22).
117	On	the	double	criminality	requirement	under	Swiss	Criminal	Law,	see	Section	3,	supra.
118	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	105,	pp.	216-218,	Paras.	2-7.
119	Not	requiring	voluntariness:	Henzelin,	supra	note	78,	p.	72,	Para.	24.
120	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	105,	p.	218,	Para.	8;	Henzelin,	supra	note	78,	p.	74,	Paras.	31-32.
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1.5. The new Swiss Criminal Code of 2007: a door opener in terms of jurisdiction
It was the new General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code, which entered into force in 2007, that gave 
considerable impetus to the extraterritorial reach of Swiss penal power. No less than three bases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction previously unknown to Swiss law were introduced in the amended code. 
The least contested jurisdictional ground is the one allowing for the application of Swiss law to cases 
where Switzerland has refused a request for extradition for a reason unrelated to the nature of the 
offence, which is based on the principle of representation.121 More controversial, and only introduced 
in the new General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code during the parliamentary debates and thus in the 
final stages of the Swiss legislative process,122 is the jurisdictional basis allowing for the application of 
Swiss law to offences qualifying as a ‘particularly serious felony that is proscribed by the international 
community’.123 However, the most hotly contested jurisdictional basis added to the Swiss Criminal Code 
is the provision allowing for the application of Swiss criminal law to a set of offences committed against 
minors abroad, a provision that requires neither double criminality nor the residence of the alleged 
offender in Switzerland.124 This absolute universality principle gave new momentum to the discussion on 
the minimum link required between a criminal case and the prosecuting state. 
1.5.1. A jurisdictional expansion to foster respect for bars to extradition
Article 7(2)(a) of the Swiss Criminal Code provides for the application of Swiss criminal law to cases 
where Switzerland has refused a request for extradition for a reason unrelated to the nature of the offence. 
This provision aims at reconciling two competing interests. On the one hand, Switzerland is obliged to 
respect certain bars to extradition, which, inter alia, protect the individual rights of the alleged offender.125 
On the other hand, Switzerland has an interest in extraditing individuals suspected of having engaged 
in criminal conduct so as not to grant a safe haven and foster impunity. In the past, this tension has 
provoked some disrespect for the mandatory grounds for refusing an extradition request.126 Providing 
Swiss criminal jurisdiction in such cases is understood as a way out of this dilemma and a means to 
realize both interests. 
The application of Swiss criminal law based on this jurisdictional ground is only possible if neither 
the alleged offender nor the supposed victim is a Swiss national.127 Furthermore, the offence must also be 
liable to prosecution at the place of commission or the place of commission is not subject to criminal law 
jurisdiction. In addition, the alleged offender must be in Switzerland and extradition is permitted for the 
offence under Swiss law but the alleged offender is not being extradited.128 However, Swiss criminal law 
does not apply if an extradition request was refused because of the nature of the offence, notably offences 
of a political, military or fiscal nature.129 In cases where the extradition request was denied for any reason 
other than the nature of the offence, the representation principle contained in Article 7(2)(a) of the Swiss 
Criminal Code is applicable, provided the other criteria are met.130 Under Swiss law,131 an extradition 
request shall not be granted, for example, if foreign proceedings would not meet the requirements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights132 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.133 
121	Art.	7(2)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
122	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	pp.	226-227,	Para.	16.
123	Art.	 7(2)(b)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code;	 wording	 of	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 by	 the	 Federal	 Authorities	 of	 the	 Swiss	
Confederation,	see	note	5,	supra.
124 Art. 5 Swiss Criminal Code.
125	An	important	bar	to	extradition	flowing	from	human	rights	law	and	international	refugee	law	is	the	principle	of	non-refoulement.	Under	
Swiss	law,	the	prohibition	of	refoulement	is	expressed	in,	inter	alia,	Art.	2(a)-(b)	of	the	Federal	Act	on	International	Mutual	Assistance	in	
Criminal	Matters.	
126	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	223,	Para.	6.
127	Introductory	words	of	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
128	Art.	7(1)(a)-(c)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	read	together	with	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
129	Art.	7(2)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	see,	e.g.,	Art.	3	Federal	Act	on	International	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters;	FF	1998	1787,	supra	
note	83,	p.	1805.
130	Henzelin,	supra	note	78,	p.	82,	Para.	17.
131	See,	e.g.,	Art.	2(a)	Federal	Act	on	International	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters.
132	1950	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	213	united nations Treaty Series p. 222 (Convention 
du 4 novembre 1950 de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, rS 0.101).
133	1966	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	999	united nations Treaty Series	p.	171 (Pacte international du 16 décembre 
1966 relatif aux droits civils et politiques, rS 0.103.2).
46
The Expansion of Swiss Criminal Jurisdiction in Light of International Law 
1.5.2. A fairly well-established idea: universal jurisdiction over particularly serious offences
Since the new General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code entered into force in 2007, Swiss criminal law is 
applicable to offences qualifying as a ‘particularly serious felony that is proscribed by the international 
community’134 if certain other criteria are met. First of all, neither the offender nor the victim is a Swiss 
national.135 Furthermore, the person subject to prosecution must be present in Switzerland.136 In addition, 
the offence must be an extraditable offence under Swiss law but the alleged offender is not actually 
extradited137 and the offence in question must also be liable to punishment at the place of commission.138
Unlike other jurisdictional principles operating on the basis of a link between the offence and the 
prosecuting state, the universality principle does not require such a connection. Rather, it is said to 
apply solely based on the nature of the offence, i.e. it is the nature of the act which in itself confers 
jurisdiction on a state.139 According to international law, offences amenable to the universality principle 
are those of particular seriousness, most notably offences comprised in the category of ‘international 
core crimes’, such as certain violations of international humanitarian law and acts of torture.140 Despite 
this delimitation, there remains some ambiguity regarding the offences that meet this seriousness 
threshold. The same holds true for Article 7(2)(b) of the Swiss Criminal Code requiring the offence to be 
a ‘particularly serious felony that is proscribed by the international community’. Identifying the offences 
that fall within the ambit of this provision of Swiss criminal law is quite a controversial topic in both 
doctrine and politics.141 Authors following a normative approach maintain that the provision applies 
to crimes recognized under international customary law and constituting ius cogens, such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity or the crime of aggression. Others follow a functional approach, according to 
which a particularly grave offence outlawed by the international community can only be one prohibited 
or criminalized by an international instrument, such as a statute of an international tribunal. Either way, 
the criterion remains vague and has been criticized as such.142
1.5.3. A controversial idea: universal jurisdiction for offences against minors abroad
Most criticism and scepticism surrounding the universality principle stems from Article 5 of the Swiss 
Criminal Code, which subjects a set of offences committed against minors abroad to an absolute 
universality principle. The principle applies to the offences of trafficking in human beings,143 indecent 
assault,144 rape,145 sexual acts with a person incapable of proper judgment or resistance146 or encouraging 
prostitution147 if the victim of each of these offences was under 18 years of age. Further, the offences of 
sexual acts with children148 if the victim was younger than 14 years and aggravated pornography149 if the 
articles or representations depict sexual acts with children are amenable to the universality principle as 
stipulated in Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code.150 From this catalogue of offences it follows that the 
134	Art.	 7(2)(b)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code;	 wording	 of	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 by	 the	 Federal	 Authorities	 of	 the	 Swiss	
Confederation,	see	note	5,	supra.
135	Introductory	words	of	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.	The	provision	requires	that	the	alleged	offender	does	not	possess	Swiss	nationality	
at	the	time	of	judgment;	the	nationality	at	the	time	of	the	commission	of	the	crime	is	immaterial;	the	victim	must	be	a	non-Swiss	national	
either	at	the	time	of	the	commission	of	the	offence	or	the	moment	when	the	criminal	result	occurs:	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	
p.	225,	Paras.	12-13;	BGE	117	IV	369,	372,	E.	3-7.	
136	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	read	together	with	Art.	7(1)(b)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	225,	Para.	11.	On	the	
presence	requirement	according	to	Art.	7(1)(b)	Swiss	Criminal	Code,	see	Section	1.2,	supra.
137	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	read	together	with	Art.	7(1)(c)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	225,	Para.	11.
138	Art.	7(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	read	together	with	Art.	7(1)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	alternatively,	the	requirement	is	also	fulfilled	if	the	place	
of	commission	is	not	subject	to	criminal	jurisdiction;	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	p.	225,	Para.	11;	Trechsel	&	Vest,	supra	note	71,	p.	33,	
Para.	14,	criticize	the	fact	that	double	criminality	is	required	for	the	exercise	of	the	universality	principle	for	particularly	serious	offences.
139	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	pp.	100-101.
140	Henzelin,	supra	note	83,	pp.	82-83,	Para.	20;	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	pp.	110-115.
141	Henzelin,	supra	note	83,	pp.	82-83,	Para.	20.	
142	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	68,	pp.	226-227,	Paras.	16-17;	Henzelin,	supra	note	83,	pp.	83-84,	Paras.	22-29.
143	Art.	182	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
144	Art.	189	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
145	Art.	190	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
146	Art.	191	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
147	Art.	195	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
148	Art.	187	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
149	Art.	197(3)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
150	Art.	5(1)(a)-(c)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
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provision aims to better protect children from sexual and commercial exploitation. This jurisdictional 
basis was introduced when the General Part of the Swiss Criminal Code was revised, mainly due to four 
parliamentary requests requiring relevant legislative action.151 A corresponding provision did not exist 
under the old Swiss Criminal Code and may also be exceptional from a comparative law perspective.
Under Article 5(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code, the exercise of jurisdiction based on this provision 
is subject to four requirements. First of all, the place of commission has to be outside Switzerland, which 
is only the case if the conduct was carried out abroad and the result occurred abroad.152 Secondly, the 
offender has to be voluntarily present in Switzerland, although temporary presence is sufficient, i.e. 
for tourism purposes or while in transit. It was only during the parliamentary debate that the required 
connection between the alleged offender and Switzerland was lowered. Instead of the more demanding 
criterion of residence or domicile in Switzerland, as was proposed in the draft law, Parliament deemed 
it sufficient to require the simple presence of the suspect in Switzerland.153 Thirdly, it is required that 
the offender is not extradited. Finally, universal jurisdiction is only provided over the above-mentioned 
offences, which are exhaustively listed in Article 5(1) of the Swiss Criminal Code.154 
It follows from these applicability criteria that the exercise of the universality principle over specific 
offences committed against minors abroad is of an absolute and unrestricted nature. Those arguing that 
the reach of Swiss penal power under this norm is too far-reaching also label it the ‘extreme universality 
principle’.155 Most criticism is engendered by the fact that Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code does not 
require that the offence in question is also criminalized at the place of commission (double criminality).156 
Furthermore, the catalogue of offences contained in Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code is criticized for 
being a somewhat random selection of crimes. For instance, the provision does not incorporate attacks 
against life and limb, which are crimes against minors of similar gravity to those amenable to universal 
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code.157
1.6. Expanding jurisdiction for the specific crime of female genital mutilation in 2012
As a general rule, civil law countries define the geographical scope of their domestic criminal law in 
general jurisdictional provisions, while common law countries rather equip specific offences with 
extraterritorial reach.158 Yet, exceptions to this rule exist and Switzerland recently followed the latter 
legislative technique in order to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offence of female genital 
mutilation. Next to defining the offence, the legislature adopted a jurisdictional rule stipulating that ‘[a]
ny person who has committed the offence abroad but is now in Switzerland and is not extradited shall be 
liable to the foregoing penalties’.159 
From this wording, it follows that – similar to Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code governing 
jurisdiction with regard to specific offences against minors abroad – an absolute and unrestricted 
universality principle has been introduced.160 The prosecution of female genital mutilation cases in 
Switzerland is thus possible without the crime featuring any connection with Switzerland, except for the 
presence of the offender, who has not been extradited. The presence requirement is already fulfilled if the 
alleged offender is in Switzerland for transit or for a very short amount of time. It is thus not required that 
151	FF	1998	1787,	supra	note	83,	pp.	1800-1801.
152		E	contrario	Art.	8(1)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
153	FF	1998	1787,	supra	note	83,	p.	1802.
154	P.	Popp	&	P.	Levante,	‘Art.	5’,	in	M.	Niggli	&	H.	Wiprächtiger	(eds.),	basler Kommentar: Strafrecht I,	2007,	p.	210,	Para.	2	and	p.	212,	
Paras.	5-8.
155	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	154,	p.	210,	Para.	2.
156	See,	e.g.,	S.	Gless,	Internationales Strafrecht: Grundriss für Studium und Praxis,	2011,	pp.	62-65;	and	Eicker,	supra	note	56,	pp.	312-314,	
summarizing	the	view	of	various	scholars	on	Art.	5	Swiss	Criminal	Code	and	the	dispensation	with	the	double	criminality	requirement.	
157	U.	Cassani	&	R.	Roth,	‘Le	juge	suisse	au	service	de	la	“communauté	des	peuples”?’,	in	A.	Donatsch	&	et	al.	(eds.),	Festschrift für Stefan 
Trechsel zum 65. Geburtstag,	2002,	p.	459.
158	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	pp.	86-87.
159	Art.	124(1)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	defines	 the	offence	of	 female	genital	mutilation,	and	Art.	124(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	stipulates	 the	
(extraterritorial)	reach	of	the	offence.
160	Parliamentary	initiative	to	explicitly	suppress	genital	mutilation	committed	in	Switzerland	and	abroad	by	anyone	in	Switzerland,	Report	of	
the	Committee	on	Legal	Affairs	National	Council,	Federal	Council	opinion	(Initiative parlementaire: réprimer explicitement les mutilations 
sexuelles commises en Suisse et commises à l’étranger par quiconque se trouve en Suisse, rapport du 30 avril 2010 de la Commission des 
affaires juridiques Conseil national, Avis du Conseil fédéral du 25 août 2010, FF 2010 5151), p. 5154.
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the suspect has his abode or residence in Switzerland.161 Swiss law is applicable to cases of female genital 
mutilation committed abroad whether or not the respective conduct is liable to punishment at the place 
of commission, i.e. no double criminality is required.162 
The jurisdictional rule of Article 124(2) of the Swiss Criminal Code extends to all forms of participation 
in the offences wherever they took place. Thus, for instance, it also covers the usual modus operandi 
where female genital mutilation takes place in the home country of migrants living in Switzerland, but 
parents or relatives of the supposed victim organize it from Switzerland or assist in the commission of 
the offence abroad. If such conduct qualifies as aiding and abetting or instigation, prosecution is possible 
in Switzerland.163
In the travaux préparatoires this very expansive approach to criminal jurisdiction is mainly explained 
by a reference to Article 5 of the Swiss Criminal Code stipulating an absolute universality principle for 
specific offences committed against minors abroad: Not only is female genital mutilation comparable in 
terms of severity to the offences listed in the provision but the main victim group is also comprised of 
minors. A self-standing argument for adopting an absolute and unrestricted universality principle and, 
more specifically, to dispose of the double criminality requirement is that female genital mutilation is 
punishable under many foreign penal laws and thus, in many cases, the double criminality requirement 
would not make any difference.164
2. Tempering the effects of applying Swiss criminal law to extraterritorial conduct
2.1. Taking foreign law into account
The Swiss legislature has considerably expanded Swiss criminal jurisdiction since the adoption of the 
Swiss Criminal Code in 1937. The assertion or the exercise of domestic criminal jurisdiction over 
offences taking place abroad – whether based on the broadly construed territoriality principle or in 
application of the provisions providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction – may cause tensions between 
states if jurisdictional claims are perceived as excessive or as lacking legitimacy.165 Moreover, conflicts 
of jurisdiction resulting from the unilateral extension of the reach of domestic criminal law by various 
states concurrently may be prejudicial to acting individuals and compromise legal certainty, notably 
the possibility to foresee the applicable law and to align conduct respectively.166 What is more, from 
the perspective of an alleged offender, the application of a law, which potentially differs from the law 
of the place of commission, may raise concerns with regard to the principle of legality.167 In order to 
– at least partially – accommodate these concerns, some jurisdictional provisions of the Swiss Criminal 
Code require that foreign law be taken into account to some extent by virtue of the double criminality 
requirement and the lex mitior principle. 
Thus, some bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Swiss Criminal Code are only available if 
the conduct in question is also liable to punishment at the place of commission, i.e. they require double 
criminality.168 This holds true for the active and passive personality principles,169 the representation 
161	FF	2010	5151,	 supra	note	160,	p.	5154;	 the	parliamentary	 initiative,	which	 requested	 the	 inclusion	of	a	provision	on	 female	genital	
mutilation	in	the	Swiss	Criminal	Code,	set	a	higher	threshold	for	the	application	of	Swiss	law:	as	opposed	to	the	current	wording,	it	made	
the	exercise	of	Swiss	criminal	jurisdiction	dependent	on	the	alleged	offender	having	his	abode	in	Switzerland.
162	FF	2010	5151,	supra	note	160,	p.	5154;	D.	Jositsch	&	A.	Murer	Mikolásek,	‘Der	Straftatbestand	der	weiblichen	Genitalverstümmelung’,	
2011 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis,	no.	10,	p.	1290.
163	Jositsch	&	Murer	Mikolásek,	 supra	note	162,	p.	1290.	As	currently	 interpreted,	 the	 territoriality	principle	does	not	apply	 to	persons	
instigating	or	aiding	and	abetting	an	offence	committed	abroad	in	or	from	Switzerland,	the	result	of	which	occurs	abroad:	see	Section	1.1,	
supra.	What	 is	more,	 the	 active	 and	 passive	 personality	 principles	 are	 often	 not	 applicable.	 Art.	 124	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 fills	 this	
jurisdictional	gap.	
164	FF	2010	5151,	supra	note	160,	p.	5154.
165	International	Law	Commission,	supra	note	2,	Para.	28,	elaborating	on	how	states	oppose	excessive	assertions	of	jurisdiction.	
166	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	p.	157;	A.	Biehler	et	al.,	Freiburg Proposal on Concurrent Jurisdictions and the Prohibition of Multiple Prosecutions 
in the European union,	2003,	p.	7;	International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	supra	note	12,	p.	1.	
167	Petrig,	supra	note	1,	p.	319.
168	Since	double	criminality	is	one	of	several	requirements	that	must	be	fulfilled	in	order	to	trigger	the	application	of	a	jurisdictional	basis	as	
such,	it	is	discussed	in	relation	to	the	threshold	of	application	of	Arts.	3-7	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
169	Art.	7(1)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
49
Anna Petrig
principle for offences that Switzerland is obliged to prosecute by virtue of an international agreement170 
and in cases where Switzerland does not extradite for a reason unrelated to the nature of the offence,171 
and – even though criticized by some scholars172 – for the universality principle for particularly serious 
offences proscribed by the international community.173 Meanwhile, the legislature was not ready to 
introduce this limiting criterion for the universality principle provided over specific offences committed 
against minors abroad and female genital mutilation. Also, as already stressed, it is irrelevant whether 
the conduct was liable to punishment at the place of commission when Swiss criminal law is applied 
based on the territoriality principle – despite the fact that extraterritorial conduct potentially comes 
within its reach due to the broad localization theory laid down in Article 8 of the Swiss Criminal Code.174 
Furthermore, since foreign law would in most cases fail to sufficiently protect the fundamental interests 
of Switzerland, the protective principle does not contain a double criminality requirement.175
Another tempering measure is the principle of lex mitior, which obliges foreign law to be taken into 
account when actually exercising Swiss criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. According to 
this principle, an offender subject to Swiss criminal law cannot be punished more severely for an offence 
committed abroad than he would be under the law of the place of commission.176 Thereby, the Swiss 
judge does not apply foreign criminal norms as such. Rather, when deciding on the sentence according 
to Swiss criminal law, he is obliged to exercise his discretion by observing what may be a more lenient 
punishment under foreign criminal law. The sentence, which would be imposed under the law of the 
place of commission, constitutes the maximum sentence that he can pronounce.177 When determining 
the sentence under foreign criminal law, the judge cannot simply refer to the abstract penalty stipulated 
in the foreign norm. Rather, he is obliged to ascertain the concrete liability of the offender in the case at 
hand. By comparing the penalty under foreign and Swiss criminal law, its overall effect must be taken 
into account, i.e. including the modalities of the penalty, such as a suspended versus an unsuspended 
sentence, and enforcement considerations, such as house arrest versus confinement in a penitentiary. 
The rationale of the lex mitior principle is thus to ensure that the offender is not treated differently from 
someone standing trial for the same conduct at the place of commission.178 Yet the principle does not apply 
with respect to all jurisdictional bases. The lex mitior principle takes effect when Swiss criminal law is 
applied based on the active and passive personality principles,179 the representation principle for offences 
that Switzerland is obliged to prosecute by virtue of an international agreement180 and in cases where 
Switzerland does not extradite for a reason unrelated to the nature of the offence,181 and the universality 
principle for particularly serious offences proscribed by the international community.182 However, in 
cases where the Swiss judge exercises jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle, the protective 
principle or the universality principle for specific offences committed against minors abroad and female 
genital mutilation, the penalty is fixed without taking into account a possibly more lenient foreign law. 
The reasons for not applying the lex mitior principle are basically the same as for not including double 
criminality as a requirement for triggering the application of a specific jurisdictional basis.183
2.2. Taking foreign judgments into account
Since every state can define its penal power autonomously within the limits of public international law, 
several states may subject the same offence to their domestic criminal law and jurisdiction. Hence, it is 
170	Art.	6(1)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
171	Arts.	7(1)	and	(2)(a)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
172	See	Section	1.5.2,	supra.
173	Art.	7(1)	and	(2)(b)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
174	See	Section	1.1,	supra.
175 Petrig, supra note 1, p. 332.
176 Petrig, supra note 1, p. 320.
177	Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	66,	Para.	191;	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	pp.	192-193,	Paras.	30-31.
178	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	pp.	192-193,	Paras.	30-31.
179	Art.	7(3)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
180	Art.	6(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
181	Art.	7(3)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
182	Art.	7(3)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
183	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	p.	192,	Para.	30.
50
The Expansion of Swiss Criminal Jurisdiction in Light of International Law 
possible that, according to the Swiss rules on the geographical scope of application, Swiss criminal law is 
applicable to conduct potentially subject to foreign investigation and prosecution or which has already 
been judged in foreign criminal proceedings. Thus, an offender could potentially be tried and punished 
by several states for the same conduct – the risk of double jeopardy is real. Therefore, Swiss criminal law 
takes foreign judgments into account to some extent. Three principles govern situations where a foreign 
criminal judgment has already been issued.184
The first is the principle of extinction,185 according to which Switzerland does not prosecute an 
offender for a specific offence if he has been acquitted by a final judgment abroad or if the sentence has 
been enforced, waived or is barred by a statute of limitations with regard to that offence. Thus, the principle 
of extinction, which not only bars double punishment but also double prosecution, is an application of 
the ne bis in idem principle.186 However, prosecution in Switzerland remains possible despite a foreign 
acquittal or an enforced, waived or prescribed sentence if the foreign proceeding contradicted the Swiss 
ordre public, i.e. if it violated fundamental principles of the Swiss Federal Constitution or the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It is rather unclear what this criterion, which was only introduced during 
the parliamentary debate and thus in the very final phase of the legislative process, encompasses.187 The 
principle of extinction applies to all bases of jurisdiction foreseen in the Swiss Criminal Code,188 except 
when the suspect is tried based on the protective principle. However, if the alleged offender is prosecuted 
in Switzerland based on the territoriality principle, the principle of extinction only applies if the person 
has been prosecuted abroad ‘at the request of the Swiss authorities’.189
Secondly, the principle of imputation obliges the Swiss judge to take into account a sentence served 
abroad. This tempers the consequences of double jeopardy, i.e. that the offender is tried again on the same 
facts in another state. In concrete terms, the judge has to subtract a fully or partially enforced foreign 
sentence from the sentence he pronounces for the same conduct.190 The principle thus reflects the idea 
of ne bis poena in idem, i.e. that an offender shall not be punished twice for the same act, and therefore 
prevents ‘an unfair accumulation of sentences’.191 The principle of imputation applies to all general bases 
of jurisdiction stipulated in Articles 3 to 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code without any exception and to 
the universality principle provided over the offence of female genital mutilation.192 Yet, it only applies 
to enforced sentences. Thus, neither an acquittal nor a suspended or prescribed sentence pronounced 
in a foreign proceeding has to be taken into account by the Swiss judge. The same holds true if the 
sentence was waived, for example due to a pardon or amnesty. Also, in cases of parole, the remainder of 
a sentence is not considered. Finally, a monetary penalty can only be counted towards the Swiss sentence 
if it has been paid.193 A direct crediting can take place if the foreign and domestic judgments foresee 
the same type of penalty; however, if the modalities of enforcement are fundamentally different, direct 
crediting may not be adequate. If the type of penalty varies between the foreign and domestic judgments 
184	Gless,	supra	note	156,	pp.	51	et	seq.;	Donatsch	&	Tag,	supra	note	54,	p.	47;	Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	p.	74,	Paras.	213-214;	M.	Harari	&	
M.	Liniger	Gros,	‘Art.	3’,	in	R.	Roth	&	L.	Moreillon	(eds.),	Commentaire romand: Code pénal I,	2009,	p.	35,	Para.	16;	S.	Trechsel	&	P.	Noll,	
Schweizerisches Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil I, 2004,	p.	57.	
185	The	principle	is	statutorily	defined	in	Arts.	3,	5(2),	6(3)	and	7(4)	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
186	Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	pp.	75-76,	Paras.	215-218.
187	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	pp.	197-198,	Para.	41;	Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	184,	pp.	43-46,	Paras.	62-77.
188	Art.	 3(3)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (territoriality	 principle);	 Art.	 7(4)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (active	 and	 passive	 personality	 principles);	
Art.	 5(3)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (universality	 principle	 for	 offences	 against	minors	 abroad);	 Art.	 7(4)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (universality	
principle	 for	 particularly	 serious	 offences);	 the	 Arts.	 124(2)	 and	 7(4)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (universality	 principle	 for	 the	 offence	 of	
female	genital	mutilation);	Art.	6(3)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(representation	principle	for	offences	prosecuted	in	terms	of	an	international	
agreement);	and	Art.	7(4)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(representation	principle	for	offences	where	extradition	request	was	rejected).
189 Art. 3(3) Swiss Criminal Code.
190	The	principle	is	statutorily	defined	in	Arts.	3(2)	and	4(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code;	with	regard	to	measures,	see	Arts.	5(3),	6(4)	and	7(5)	Swiss	
Criminal Code.
191	S.	Trechsel	&	H.	Vest,	‘Artikel	3	StGB’,	in	S.	Trechsel	&	M.	Pieth	(eds.),	Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch: Praxiskommentar, 2013, p. 21, 
Para.	6,	citing	BGE	105	IV	225,	227	E.	3;	Hurtado	Pozo,	supra	note	34,	pp.	74-75,	Para.	214.
192	Art.	3(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(territoriality	principle);	Art.	4(2)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(protective	principle);	Art.	7(5)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	
(active	 and	passive	 personality	 principles);	 Art.	 5(3)	 Swiss	 Criminal	 Code	 (universality	 principle	 for	 offences	 against	minors	 abroad);	
Art.	7(5)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(universality	principle	for	particularly	serious	offences);	Arts.	124(2)	and	7(5)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(universality	
principle	for	the	offence	of	female	genital	mutilation);	Art.	6(4)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(representation	principle	for	offences	prosecuted	in	
terms	of	an	international	agreement);	and	Art.	7(5)	Swiss	Criminal	Code	(representation	principle	for	offences	where	extradition	request	
was	rejected).
193	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	pp.	200-201,	Paras.	46-47;	Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	184,	p.	35,	Para.	17	and	p.	36,	Paras.	19-23.
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(e.g. a monetary fine and imprisonment) a conversion has to take place and the judge can exercise some 
discretion.194
Thirdly, according to the principle of enforcement, the (remainder of a) foreign sentence, which has 
not or has only partially been enforced abroad, is enforced in Switzerland. The person is not subjected to 
new proceedings in Switzerland. However, the principle only applies if Switzerland claims jurisdiction 
based on territoriality and only if the person has been prosecuted abroad ‘at the request of the Swiss 
authorities’.195 With regard to measures,196 the Swiss judge has to decide whether it is appropriate to execute 
a measure of foreign law in Switzerland. Thus, in juxtaposition to sentences, which are automatically 
enforced in Switzerland, a new proceeding is required.197We can thus conclude that the Swiss legislature 
has not been indifferent to the problems potentially created by the unilateral extension of Swiss criminal 
law and has tempered its effects by stipulating that foreign law and judgments are taken into account to 
some extent. 
3. The expansive approach to criminal jurisdiction in light of international law 
The Swiss legislature has clearly followed the global trend of broadening the extraterritorial reach of 
domestic criminal law. Especially since the 1980s, and with particular resolve in the last decade, it has 
added jurisdictional bases to the Swiss Criminal Code by virtue of which Swiss criminal law can be 
applied to conduct taking place abroad. Certain offences – specified crimes against minors and female 
genital mutilation – have even been subjected to an absolute and unrestricted universality principle. Thus, 
the idea that a substantiated link between an offence and Switzerland is necessary to warrant domestic 
prosecution has been abandoned.198 
We have seen that this unilateral extension of domestic criminal jurisdiction may cause tensions 
with third states and is not unproblematic for the acting individual in terms of legal certainty and for 
the alleged offender regarding the prohibition of double prosecution and punishment. Against this 
background, the jurisdictional rules of the Swiss Criminal Code provide that foreign law and judgments 
are taken into account to some extent when the Swiss judge applies Swiss criminal law to extraterritorial 
conduct.199 However, the effect of these tempering measures is fairly limited since they do not apply in 
their entirety to all jurisdictional bases. What is more, they do not prevent or solve jurisdictional conflicts 
but merely temper specific effects that result from applying Swiss law to conduct committed abroad. 
This development in Swiss criminal law and the negative impact it potentially has on international 
relations and for the acting individual and alleged offender begs the question whether such an expansive 
approach to criminal jurisdiction is permissible under international law – or even encouraged or 
requested by it. 
3.1. International law pushing for long-arm jurisdiction
Various rules of international law are clearly pushing for long-arm criminal jurisdiction, notably in the 
realm of transnational criminal law and human rights law. Thus, it is a feature of treaties on transnational 
criminal law200 to strive for a dense jurisdictional net aimed at avoiding the potential impunity of alleged 
criminals. Consequently, they encourage and, to some extent, even oblige State Parties to establish 
criminal jurisdiction over the respective treaty offences even if committed abroad based on different 
connecting factors, such as the nationality of the alleged offender or the supposed victim.201 
194	Popp	&	Levante,	supra	note	11,	p.	201,	Para.	47.
195 Art. 3(3) Swiss Criminal Code.
196	On	the	various	measures	under	Swiss	criminal	law,	see	Arts.	56	et	seq.	Swiss	Criminal	Code.
197	Harari	&	Liniger	Gros,	supra	note	184,	p.	47,	Paras.	78-81.
198	See	Section	1,	supra.
199	See	Section	2,	supra.
200	For	 present	 purposes,	 the	 following	 definition	of	 ‘transnational	 criminal	 law’	 is	 adopted:	 the	 ‘body	 of	 international	 treaties	 dealing	
with	crimes	of	a	transnational	character’	(C.	Kreβ,	‘International	Criminal	Law’,	in	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law,	
Para.	 6,	 <www.mpepil.com>	 (last	 visited	25	April	 2013));	 this	branch	of	 international	 criminal	 law	 is	distinct	 from	 the	 rules	defining	
the	prescriptive	 criminal	 jurisdiction	of	 states,	 the	 law	of	 international	 cooperation	 in	 criminal	matters,	 namely	extradition	 law,	 and	
international	criminal	law	stricto	sensu	establishing	individual	criminal	responsibility	directly	under	international	law.
201	To	provide	just	one	of	many	possible	examples,	the	2000	United	Nations	Convention	on	Transnational	Organized	Crime	and	the	Protocols	
52
The Expansion of Swiss Criminal Jurisdiction in Light of International Law 
In addition to treaties on transnational criminal law, human rights law, which is relevant to the 
issue of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction because many transnational criminal offences amount to 
human rights violations, is a driving force behind the expansion of the geographical scope of domestic 
criminal law. Even though this body of law primarily aims at protecting the individual from unjustified 
interferences with his liberties by the state (the obligation to respect), it also imposes a duty on states to 
protect persons under their jurisdiction from harmful conduct by private persons. This dimension of 
human rights law namely obliges the legislature to enact (criminal) norms protecting the individual from 
harmful acts emanating from private persons.202 
That international law, notably transnational criminal law and human rights law, push for long-
arm jurisdiction can be illustrated by the example of the offence of female genital mutilation, which the 
Swiss legislature recently enclosed in the Swiss Criminal Code and which it equipped with an absolute 
universality principle. Thus, the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence of the Council of Europe203 obliges every State Party to establish jurisdiction when the 
offence is committed on its territory, on board a ship or aircraft flying its flag, by one of its nationals or by 
a person having his or her habitual residence in its territory.204 Based on the principle of representation, 
State Parties are also obliged to establish jurisdiction in cases where the alleged perpetrator is present 
in their territory and they will not extradite him solely on the basis of his nationality.205 Moreover, the 
Convention encourages State Parties to establish jurisdiction over cases where the offence is committed 
against a girl or a woman who is a national of or a resident of that state.206 Finally, the Convention explicitly 
approves of any other type of criminal jurisdiction set up under domestic law so long as it is in line with 
international law207 – hence, the already quite comprehensive list of bases of jurisdiction State Parties are 
obliged or encouraged to enact under municipal law is not exhaustive.208 What is more, the Convention 
requires that the threshold for applying national criminal law based on these jurisdictional principles is 
set low. Most notably, the Convention stipulates that states must not make the application of domestic 
criminal law to female genital mutilation committed abroad dependent on double criminality.209 Doing 
away with the ‘usual rule of dual criminality’ is understood as a ‘major step forward in the protection of 
victims’,210 since it allows for the prosecution of the offence even if the practice is not liable to punishment 
at the place of commission. 
In addition to transnational criminal law, human rights law also requires that the offence of female 
genital mutilation – which may amount to inhuman treatment211 and discrimination on the basis of 
sex,212 and potentially violates the right to the highest attainable standard of health213 and the right 
Thereto,	2225	united nations Treaty Series p.	209,	contains	a	series	of	mandatory	grounds	of	jurisdiction	in	Arts.	15(1)	and	(3)	and	a	series	
of	optional	grounds	of	jurisdiction	in	Arts.	15(2)	and	(4).	
202	A.	Peters	&	T.	Altwicker,	Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention,	2012,	pp.	20-21;	specifically	with	regard	to	female	genital	mutilation,	
see	Trechsel	&	Noll,	supra	note	184,	pp.	27-28.
203	2011	Council	of	Europe	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence,	Council of Europe 
Treaty Series	No.	210.	Per	Art.	75,	the	Convention	must	be	ratified	by	ten	states,	including	eight	Member	States	of	the	Council	of	Europe	
in	order	to	enter	into	force.	As	of	19	April	2013,	the	total	number	of	signatures	not	followed	by	ratifications	stood	at	26	while	three	
states	 (Albania,	 Portugal	 and	 Turkey)	 have	 ratified	 the	 treaty:	 available	 at	 <www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.
asp?NT=210&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG>	(last	visited	19	April	2013).
204	Art.	44(1)	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence.
205	Art.	44(5)	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence.
206	Art.	44(2)	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence.	
207	Art.	44(7)	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence.	
208	Council	of	Europe,	‘Council	of	Europe	Convention	on	preventing	and	combating	violence	against	women	and	domestic	violence	(CETS	
No.	210):	Explanatory	Report’,	Para.	231,	<http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/210.htm> (last visited 25 April 2013).
209	Art.	44(3)	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence.	Furthermore,	Art.	44(4)	Convention	
on	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence	stipulates	that	the	exercise	of	jurisdiction	based	on	the	
nationality	or	residence	of	the	alleged	perpetrator	must	not	be	subordinated	to	the	condition	that	the	prosecution	can	only	be	initiated	
following	the	reporting	by	the	supposed	victim	or	the	laying	of	information	by	the	state	of	the	place	where	the	offence	was	committed.	
210	Council	of	Europe,	supra	note	208,	Para.	227.
211	Art.	3	ECHR	and	Art.	7	ICCPR:	Trechsel	&	Noll,	supra	note	184,	p.	28.
212	As,	e.g.,	prohibited	by	the	1979	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	against	Women,	1249	united nations Treaty 
Series p. 13 (Convention du 18 décembre 1979 sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes, rS 0.108);	
Jositsch	&	Murer	Mikolásek,	supra	note	162,	p.	1282.
213	See,	e.g.,	Art.	24(1)	1989	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child,	1577	united nations Treaty Series p. 3 (Convention du 20 novembre 1989 
relative aux droits de l’enfant, rS 0.107);	Jositsch	&	Murer	Mikolásek,	supra	note	162,	p.	1282.
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to life214 – is equipped with a broad jurisdictional rule. Thus, the European Court of Human Rights 
stated in quite robust terms that by virtue of Articles 1 and 3 ECHR, State Parties are required ‘to take 
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (...) administered by private individuals (...). Children 
and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective 
deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity’.215 Arguably, the offence of female genital 
mutilation under Swiss criminal law only has ‘effective deterrence’ if applicable to conduct abroad given 
that the offence is generally committed outside the country. That domestic legislatures should provide 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction for specific offences also finds support in the concluding observations 
of different human rights treaty supervisory bodies. They not only commend states that have adopted 
criminal provisions applying to specific transnational offences committed abroad,216 but also encourage 
states to enact criminal law provisions dealing with specific transnational offences with a long arm.217 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child even urged states to adopt norms with extraterritorial reach 
criminalizing female genital mutilation.218 
Overall, various norms of international law lend support to the idea that domestic legislatures are 
not only allowed to, but are encouraged and sometimes even obliged to equip specific offences with 
extraterritorial reach.
3.2. International law limiting the legislature in expanding the reach of domestic law
While some rules of public international law push for long-arm jurisdiction, others set limits on the 
endeavour of expanding the reach of domestic penal power. Such limitations derive most notably from 
general public international law219 but also from human rights law. While international law is quite 
specific and precise regarding the expansion of the reach of domestic criminal law with respect to specific 
transnational offences, the limits that general public international law imposes on states in this matter 
are quite amorphous. To use the words of ICJ Judge Fitzmaurice: ‘international law does not impose 
hard and fast rules on States delimiting the spheres of national jurisdictions’.220 Hence, a set of general 
jurisdictional rules of an international nature does not yet exist. Moreover, concrete and substance-
bound rules, notably those which can be found in the law of the sea, are few and far between.221 Rather, 
state jurisdiction is limited by different major principles of general public international law.
214	See,	e.g.,	Art.	2	ECHR	and	Art.	2	ICCPR.
215	ECtHR	23	September	1998,	A. v The united Kingdom,	appl.	no.	25599/94,	Para.	22,	cited	by	Trechsel	&	Noll,	supra	note		184,	p.	28.	
216	See,	e.g.,	the	following	statement	by	the	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	 ‘Consideration	of	reports	submitted	by	
States	parties	under	articles	16	and	17	of	the	Covenant:	Luxembourg’,	UN	Doc.	E/2004/22	(2003),	p.	24,	Para.	73	(emphasis	added):	
‘The	Committee welcomes	the	measures	undertaken	by	the	State	party	to	combat	trafficking	in	persons,	child	pornography	and	sexual	
exploitation	of	women	and	children.	In	particular,	the	Committee	welcomes the extraterritorial application of certain provisions of the 
Penal Code,	allowing	for	the	criminal	prosecution	of	persons,	both	nationals	and	non-nationals,	for sexual crimes committed abroad.’
217	See,	 e.g.,	 Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child,	 ‘Concluding	 Observations:	 Slovenia’,	 UN	 Doc.	 CRC/C/15/Add.230	 (2004),	 Para.	 65	
(emphasis	added):	‘The	Committee recommends	that	the	State	party	strengthen	the	legal	protection	of	children	against	various	forms	
of	abuse	on	the	Internet,	 including	child	pornography,	and	introduce	 legislation	which	would	make Slovene citizens liable to criminal 
prosecution for child abuse committed abroad.’
218	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child,	‘Concluding	Observations:	Netherlands’,	UN	Doc.	CRC/C/15/Add.114	(1999),	Para.	18	(emphasis	
added),	held:	‘The	Committee	welcomes	the	efforts	made	and	understands	the	difficulties	faced	by	the	State	Party	in	protecting	girls	
within	its	jurisdiction	from	female	genital	mutilation	carried	out	outside	its	territory.	Nevertheless,	the	Committee urges the State Party 
(...) to consider adopting legislation with extraterritorial reach which could improve the protection of children within its jurisdiction from 
such harmful traditional practices.’	See	also	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child,	‘Concluding	Observations:	Austria’,	UN	Doc.	CRC/C/15/
Add.251	(2005),	Paras.	43-44	(emphasis	added),	where	it	stated:	‘While	welcoming	the	legal	measures	to	prohibit	and	prosecute	cases	
of	female	genital	mutilation	(FGM),	the	Committee	is	concerned	that	this	practice	involving	girls	and	young	women	in	the	context	of	
immigrant	communities	still	occurs	in	Austria	and	abroad	where	certain	children	are	taken	to	perform	the	procedure	and	brought	back.’	
‘The	Committee recommends	that	the	State	Party	strengthen	its	efforts	to	prevent	and	eliminate	this	practice	(...)	by	considering	the	
possibility of making punishable by law the acts of those involved in the performance of FGM outside Austria.’
219	On	the	limits	imposed	by	international	law	in	terms	of	criminal	jurisdiction,	see	Ryngaert,	supra	note	1,	Chapters	2	and	4.
220 barcelona Traction, light and Power Company, limited (belgium v Spain),	Separate	Opinion	of	Judge	Sir	Gerald	Fitzmaurice,	[1970]	ICJ	
Reports	103,	p.	105.
221	See,	e.g.,	Art.	27	UNCLOS	limiting	the	coastal	state’s	jurisdictional	competence	regarding	incidents	on	board	foreign-flagged	ships	and	
Art.	97	UNCLOS	regulating	penal	 jurisdiction	in	matters	of	collision	or	any	other	 incident	of	navigation	(M.H.	Nordquist	et	al.,	united 
nations Convention on the law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary: Volume II: Articles 1 to 85,	1993,	and	M.H.	Nordquist	et	al.,	united 
nations Convention on the law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary: Volume III: Articles 86 to 132 and Documentary Annexes,	1995);	 in	
addition,	customary	international	law	excludes	port	state	jurisdiction	in	instances	relating	to	the	‘internal	economy	of	ships’	lying	in	its	
port	(R.	Churchill	&	A.	Vaughan	Lowe,	The law of the Sea,	1999,	pp.	54-55;	E.J.	Molenaar, ‘Port	State	Jurisdiction’, in The Max Planck 
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The most fundamental, yet vague, limitation imposed on states when defining the geographical 
reach of their criminal law flows from the principle of the sovereign equality of states and its corollary, 
the principle of non-intervention. These basic tenets governing interstate relations are laid down in 
Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. States must therefore refrain from extending the scope of 
application of their domestic criminal law in a way that conflicts with the principle of non-intervention.222 
In order to determine whether a jurisdictional assertion of a state oversteps that limit, the application of 
an interest-balancing test has been proposed, gauging the interest of state A to apply its law to conduct 
abroad against the interest of state B to have exclusive jurisdiction over acts and omissions occurring in 
its territory and not to be forced to tolerate the exercise of jurisdiction by state A.223 However, given the 
vague nature of the principles of the sovereign equality of states and non-intervention (and the different 
state interests to be balanced against each other flowing therefrom), it is difficult to identify the exact 
point at which a jurisdictional claim would violate Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter.224 
A further limiting principle of general public international law is the requirement that the state 
advancing a jurisdictional claim must have a genuine connection or real link to the matter it aims to 
subject to its criminal law.225 This connection or link of a state to persons, property or acts lies at the root 
of all classical jurisdictional principles.226 However, more than one state may have a genuine connection 
or real link to a specific matter (and thus have a legitimate jurisdictional claim), which necessitates a 
further inquiry into which state possesses the strongest contact point.227 International law provides 
various – again rather vague – principles for solving instances of positive conflicts of competence. In 
line with ICJ Judge Fitzmaurice’s separate opinion in Barcelona Traction, some argue that the principle 
of jurisdictional reasonableness, restraint or moderation is a principle of international law228 rather 
than a requirement of comity,229 which obliges every state ‘to exercise moderation and restraint as to the 
extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue 
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by 
another State’.230 Further indications for solving positive conflicts of jurisdiction arguably flow from the 
principle of proportionality. Applied to the law of jurisdiction, it implies that one state’s jurisdictional 
assertion does not interfere with the interests of another state in a way that is disproportionate to the 
object or aim of that assertion.231 Moreover, the doctrine of abuse of rights provides guidance in solving 
jurisdictional conflicts,232 which (quite similar to the principle of proportionality) prohibits the exercise 
of a right in a manner that does not serve a ‘legitimate social goal’.233 
Limitations on the extension of domestic penal power also flow from international human rights law. 
It suffices for the purposes at hand to state that all those human rights embodying aspects of the principle 
of legality, legal certainty and the rule of law, and thus requiring that legal norms must be concrete, 
accessible, predictable and foreseeable, arguably impose limitations on the reach of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction.234 
Encyclopedia of Public International law, Paras.	1,	7	and	11,	<www.mpepil.com> (last visited 25 April 2013). 
222	Council	of	Europe	–	European	Committee	on	Crime	Problems,	supra	note	1,	pp.	459-460;	K.	Ambos,	‘Privatdozent	am	Max-Planck	Institut	
für	 ausländisches	 und	 internationales	 Strafrecht’,	 in	 B.	 von	 Heintschel-Heinegg	 (ed.),	Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
Band	1	§§	1-51	StGB,	2003,	pp.	94-95,	Para.	19.
223	B.H.	Oxman,	 ‘Jurisdiction	of	States’,	 in	Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International law,	Para.	9,	<www.mpepil.com> (last visited 
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230 barcelona Traction, light and Power Company, limited (belgium v Spain), supra note 220, p. 105.
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234	See,	e.g.,	M.	Luchtman,	‘Towards	a	Transnational	Application	of	the	Legality	Principle	in	the	EU’s	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice?’,	
2013 utrecht law review	9,	no.	4,	pp.	11-33	framing	the	principle	of	legality	and	the	issue	of	criminal	jurisdiction	in	terms	of	human	
rights;	and	J.	Lelieur,	‘“Transnationalising”	ne bis In Idem:	How	the	Rule	of	ne bis In Idem	Reveals	the	Principle	of	Personal	Legal	Certainty’,	
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4. Outlook – A need for general principles governing criminal jurisdiction?
It has been demonstrated that the Swiss legislature clearly followed the global trend of broadening the 
extraterritorial reach of domestic criminal law. Since the adoption of the Swiss Criminal Code in 1937, 
it has continuously added jurisdictional bases to the Code or bolstered existing ones. The legislature has 
acted with particular resolve in the last decade and multiplied the instances where Swiss criminal law can 
be applied to extraterritorial conduct and – for some offences – set the bar for applying Swiss criminal 
law to conduct committed abroad considerably low. Thus, for instance, specified crimes against minors 
and female genital mutilation have even been subjected to an absolute and unrestricted universality 
principle. The Swiss legislature is not indifferent to the problems that may be created by such an expansive 
approach to jurisdiction and the potential jurisdictional conflicts resulting therefrom, notably in terms 
of legal certainty and the prohibition of double jeopardy. Yet the rules it has adopted to temper these 
negative effects – a limited obligation to take foreign law and judgments into account when applying 
Swiss law to extraterritorial conduct – do not apply to all jurisdictional bases and cannot prevent or solve 
jurisdictional conflicts. International law does not offer hard and fast rules that guide, coordinate and limit 
the definition of the geographical scope of application of municipal criminal law by domestic legislatures. 
Rather, international law informing the determination of the reach of domestic penal power is Janus-
faced – some (rather concrete) rules push for long-arm jurisdiction while other (more amorphous) rules 
put limits on the domestic legislature’s endeavour to expand the reach of its domestic criminal law – and 
thus in many instances is not very explicit as to the limits it imposes on legislatures and courts when 
defining the reach of the domestic ius puniendi. In light of this, the idea of adopting general principles on 
an international level to govern jurisdictional issues for transnational cases is tempting – and has been 
since 1935 when the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime was published. 
Despite various (political and scholarly) efforts following the Convention’s publication to create general 
jurisdictional rules for transnational criminal cases on the international level, such a set of rules does not 
yet exist. An attempt to do so was renewed in 2006 when the International Law Commission ascertained 
a ‘strong need for codification’235 regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction and decided to include the topic 
in its long-term working programme.236 Whether this and similar endeavours will ultimately succeed in 
adopting general jurisdictional rules – which integrate the commands flowing from international rules 
pushing for an expansion but also those limiting the reach of domestic penal power – notably depends on 
the stance taken by states on jurisdiction: whether they perceive the assertion and exercise of jurisdiction 
as a concept primarily rooted in and limited by international law or as a pure manifestation of state 
power. ¶
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